<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/"
	>

<channel>
	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
	<atom:link href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/03/01/an-introduction-to-activist-stewardship/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu</link>
	<description>The leading online blog in the fields of corporate governance and financial regulation.</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Wed, 24 Jun 2026 20:59:29 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<language>en-US</language>
	<sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>https://wordpress.org/?v=6.5.8</generator>

 
	<item>
		<title>An Introduction to Activist Stewardship</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/03/01/an-introduction-to-activist-stewardship/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=an-introduction-to-activist-stewardship</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/03/01/an-introduction-to-activist-stewardship/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 01 Mar 2021 13:54:55 +0000</pubDate>
<!-- 		<dc:creator><![CDATA[]]></dc:creator> -->
				<category><![CDATA[Accounting & Disclosure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ESG]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Institutional Investors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Boards of Directors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Climate change]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Engagement]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hedge funds]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Index funds]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Long-Term value]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pension funds]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder activism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Stewardship]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sustainability]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=136544?d=20210302085744EST</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The time has come for “activist stewardship.” Simply put, this means putting the skills and techniques of activist hedge funds to work where a company’s financial performance is deteriorating and traditional engagement tools have failed to produce meaningful results to protect value and mitigate long-term risks, including recognizing the importance of environmental, social, and governance [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Robert Eccles (Oxford University), Aeisha Mastagni (CalSTRS), and Kirsty Jenkinson (CalSTRS), on Monday, March 1, 2021 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a class="external" href="https://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/about-us/people/robert-g-eccles" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Robert G. Eccles</a> is Visiting Professor of Management Practice at Oxford University Said Business School; Aeisha Mastagni is Portfolio Manager within the Sustainable Investment &amp; Stewardship Strategies Unit at the California State Retirement System (CalSTRS); and Kirsty Jenkinson is Head of Sustainable Investment &amp; Stewardship Strategies at CalSTRS. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3544978">The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance</a> by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/03/02/the-illusory-promise-of-stakeholder-governance/">here</a>); <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3004794">Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value</a> by Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/09/05/companies-should-maximize-shareholder-welfare-not-market-value/">here</a>); and <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3244665">Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee</a> by Max M. Schanzenbach and Robert H. Sitkoff (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/09/20/the-law-and-economics-of-environmental-social-and-governance-investing-by-a-fiduciary/">here</a>).</p>
</div></hgroup><p>The time has come for “activist stewardship.” Simply put, this means putting the skills and techniques of activist hedge funds to work where a company’s financial performance is deteriorating and traditional engagement tools have failed to produce meaningful results to protect value and mitigate long-term risks, including recognizing the importance of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) risks. Historically, ESG issues have been the province of the engagement and stewardship group in the asset manager due to their importance in creating value over the long-term. These groups have sought to change corporate behavior through private, constructive conversations. Large asset managers, including asset owners who manage their own assets, have been rapidly increasing their commitment to engagement and, more broadly, to stewardship activities including proxy voting and advocacy work with regulators and policy makers.</p>
<p>Despite this growing commitment to engagement, there are some companies who remain absolutely implacable after years or even decades of efforts by their shareholders. We call them “Corporate Castles.” They are uninterested in engaging with their shareholders, let alone stakeholders. They have drawn a moat around their corporate walls and are exercising every means at their disposal to persist in their practices, even as their financial performance declines and the negative externalities they are creating in the world persist. For such companies, the traditional tools of engagement, typically used in selective and discrete fashion, are simply not effective.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/03/01/an-introduction-to-activist-stewardship/#more-136544" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading An Introduction to Activist Stewardship">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/03/01/an-introduction-to-activist-stewardship/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>1</slash:comments>
		</item>
	</channel>
</rss>
