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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>CEO Compensation: Evidence From the Field &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>CEO Compensation: Evidence From the Field</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/07/12/ceo-compensation-evidence-from-the-field/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=ceo-compensation-evidence-from-the-field</link>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 12 Jul 2021 12:55:21 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Boards of Directors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Empirical Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Executive Compensation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Contracts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Equity-based compensation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Incentives]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Say on pay]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Surveys]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[In our paper, CEO Compensation: Evidence from the Field, which was recently made available on SSRN, we survey over 200 directors of FTSE All-Share companies and over 150 investors in UK equities on how they design CEO pay packages: their objectives, the constraints they operate under, and the factors they take into account. The answers [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Alex Edmans (London Business School), Tom Gosling (London Business School), and Dirk Jenter (London School of Economics), on Monday, July 12, 2021 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://alexedmans.com/">Alex Edmans</a> is Professor of Finance at London Business School; <a href="https://www.london.edu/faculty-and-research/faculty-profiles/g/gosling-tom">Tom Gosling</a> is an Executive Fellow at London Business School; and <a href="https://personal.lse.ac.uk/jenter/">Dirk Jenter</a> is Associate Professor of Finance at the London School of Economics. This post is based on their recent paper. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes <span style="font-size: 10pt;">the book </span><a style="font-size: 10pt;" href="http://www.pay-without-performance.com/">Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation</a><span style="font-size: 10pt;">, </span><a style="font-size: 10pt;" href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=364220">Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem</a><span style="font-size: 10pt;">, and <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1535355">Paying for Long-Term Performance</a> (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2010/04/27/paying-for-long-term-performance/">here</a>), all by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried.</span></p>
</div></hgroup><p>In our paper, <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3877391">CEO Compensation: Evidence from the Field</a>, which was recently made available on SSRN, we survey over 200 directors of FTSE All-Share companies and over 150 investors in UK equities on how they design CEO pay packages: their objectives, the constraints they operate under, and the factors they take into account. The answers reveal several interesting results that challenge existing academic theories, which we organize into three groups:</p>
<h2>Objective and constraints</h2>
<p>We first ask respondents to rank the importance of three goals when setting CEO pay. 65% of directors view attracting the right CEO as most critical, while 34% prioritize designing a structure that motivates the CEO. For investors, these figures are 44% and 51% respectively. This reversal reflects a theme that recurs throughout our survey—directors view labor market forces, and thus the so-called “participation constraint”, as more important than investors, who prioritize the “incentive constraint”. Only 1% of directors and 5% of investors view keeping the level of pay down as their primary goal. This is consistent with CEO pay being a small percentage of firm value, while hiring a subpar CEO or providing suboptimal incentives has potentially large effects. <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/07/12/ceo-compensation-evidence-from-the-field/#more-139027" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading CEO Compensation: Evidence From the Field">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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