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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Say on Pay: Approval Slides as CEO Pay Rises &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Say on Pay: Approval Slides as CEO Pay Rises</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/07/13/say-on-pay-approval-slides-as-ceo-pay-rises/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=say-on-pay-approval-slides-as-ceo-pay-rises</link>
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		<pubDate>Tue, 13 Jul 2021 12:51:49 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Corporate Elections & Voting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Executive Compensation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Institutional Investors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Say on pay]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder voting]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Over the past year, COVID-19 has been the driving force behind shifting trends in corporate governance. With large unemployment rates at the beginning of the pandemic (13.8% in May 2020), a declining stock market and vast uncertainty, it has been a historical time to track whether the world’s most powerful executives would feel similar effects [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Samar Feghhi, Equilar, Inc., on Tuesday, July 13, 2021 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;">Samar Feghhi is a Research Analyst at Equilar, Inc. This post is based on her Equilar memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=648682">The Growth of Executive Pay</a> by Lucian Bebchuk and Yaniv Grinstein; the book <a href="http://www.pay-without-performance.com/">Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation</a>, by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried; and <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=364220">Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem</a> by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>Over the past year, COVID-19 has been the driving force behind shifting trends in corporate governance. With large unemployment rates at the beginning of the pandemic (<a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/06/11/unemployment-rose-higher-in-three-months-of-covid-19-than-it-did-in-two-years-of-the-great-recession/">13.8</a>% in May 2020), a declining stock market and vast uncertainty, it has been a historical time to track whether the world’s most powerful executives would feel similar effects to the rest of the population. At the start, it seemed that they would. <a href="https://www.equilar.com/blogs/504-early-look-at-ceo-pay-trends">Executive compensation took a slight hit</a> with CEO pay cuts and changes to long-term incentive plans, but the overarching question remained unanswered: Were these changes significant enough to align with the world’s hardships, or were companies more focused on retaining their highest-paid employees? With 2021 Say on Pay votes well underway, data surrounding executive compensation approval may provide an answer to this question and display if COVID-19 increased the disconnect between the boardroom and shareholders.</p>
<p>Equilar’s <a href="https://www.equilar.com/blogs/505-early-say-on-pay.html">early look</a> at 2021 Say on Pay results highlighted that out of the 43 companies in the Equilar 500 with disclosed votes, around 20% received under 70% approval (considered a failure by proxy advisory firm ISS). As of May 20, 247 Equilar 500 companies held their annual meetings with 8.9% in the under 70% mark and 3.6% receiving under 50%, or a failed vote.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/07/13/say-on-pay-approval-slides-as-ceo-pay-rises/#more-138989" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Say on Pay: Approval Slides as CEO Pay Rises">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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