<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/"
	>

<channel>
	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
	<atom:link href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/09/07/the-coming-shift-in-shareholder-activism-from-firm-specific-to-systematic-risk-proxy-campaigns-and-how-to-enable-them/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu</link>
	<description>The leading online blog in the fields of corporate governance and financial regulation.</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Wed, 15 Sep 2021 13:16:22 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<language>en-US</language>
	<sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>https://wordpress.org/?v=5.8</generator>
	<item>
		<title>The Coming Shift in Shareholder Activism: From &#8220;Firm-Specific&#8221; to &#8220;Systematic Risk&#8221; Proxy Campaigns (and How to Enable Them)</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/09/07/the-coming-shift-in-shareholder-activism-from-firm-specific-to-systematic-risk-proxy-campaigns-and-how-to-enable-them/</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/09/07/the-coming-shift-in-shareholder-activism-from-firm-specific-to-systematic-risk-proxy-campaigns-and-how-to-enable-them/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 07 Sep 2021 13:13:19 +0000</pubDate>
<!-- 		<dc:creator><![CDATA[]]></dc:creator> -->
				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Boards of Directors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Corporate Elections & Voting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ESG]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Institutional Investors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Climate change]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Engine No. 1]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ExxonMobil]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hedge funds]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Proxy contests]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder activism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder voting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sustainability]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=140120?d=20210907091319EDT</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[A new form of shareholder activism has appeared almost out of the blue. Classic shareholder activism (which I will call “firm specific” activism) depends on an entrepreneur (usually an activist hedge fund) who assembles a 5% (or greater) block of stock, files a Schedule 13D that announces its plans for the target company (which might [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by John C. Coffee (Columbia University), on Tuesday, September 7, 2021 </em><div style="background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px"><strong>Editor's Note: </strong> <a href="https://www.law.columbia.edu/faculty/john-c-coffee-jr">John C. Coffee, Jr.</a> is the Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law at Columbia University Law School. This post is based on his recent <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3908163">paper</a>. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes <a style="font-size: 10pt;" href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2291577">The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism</a><span style="font-size: 10pt;"> by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang (discussed on the Forum </span><a style="font-size: 10pt;" href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/08/19/the-long-term-effects-of-hedge-fund-activism/">here</a><span style="font-size: 10pt;">); </span><a style="font-size: 10pt;" href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2948869">Dancing with Activists</a><span style="font-size: 10pt;"> by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, and Thomas Keusch (discussed on the Forum </span><a style="font-size: 10pt;" href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/30/dancing-with-activists/">here</a><span style="font-size: 10pt;">); and </span><a style="font-size: 10pt;" href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2921901">Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System</a><span style="font-size: 10pt;"> by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum </span><a style="font-size: 10pt;" href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/02/23/who-bleeds-when-the-wolves-bite/">here</a><span style="font-size: 10pt;">).</span>
</div></hgroup><p>A new form of shareholder activism has appeared almost out of the blue. Classic shareholder activism (which I will call “firm specific” activism) depends on an entrepreneur (usually an activist hedge fund) who assembles a 5% (or greater) block of stock, files a Schedule 13D that announces its plans for the target company (which might include changing management, breaking up the company, or increasing its leverage), and then profits on that block when the market responds favorably. But in this new form &#8212; “systematic risk activism” &#8212; the key actors are index funds and diversified asset managers. Nor do they necessarily expect a positive market reaction in the short-run. Being fully diversified, these investors care little about the specifics of any individual company in their portfolio. For example, State Street Global Advisors holds over 11,000 stocks, all for the long-run.</p>
<p>According to the Capital Asset Pricing Model, the goal of these investors should be to seek to reduce their exposure to “systematic risk” (which is defined as the risk that remains in any portfolio after it is fully diversified). Today, the consensus among investment managers is that the leading systematic risk comes from climate change. I describe the rationale and mechanisms of this new form of activism in an <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3908163">article just posted on SSRN</a>, but its key features are discernible in Engine No. 1’s successful, but problematic, proxy contest this year against ExxonMobil.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/09/07/the-coming-shift-in-shareholder-activism-from-firm-specific-to-systematic-risk-proxy-campaigns-and-how-to-enable-them/#more-140120" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading The Coming Shift in Shareholder Activism: From &#8220;Firm-Specific&#8221; to &#8220;Systematic Risk&#8221; Proxy Campaigns (and How to Enable Them)">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/09/07/the-coming-shift-in-shareholder-activism-from-firm-specific-to-systematic-risk-proxy-campaigns-and-how-to-enable-them/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>1</slash:comments>
		</item>
	</channel>
</rss>
