<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/"
	>

<channel>
	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
	<atom:link href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/11/13/roundup-of-director-overboarding-policies/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu</link>
	<description>The leading online blog in the fields of corporate governance and financial regulation.</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Thu, 09 Jul 2026 19:49:57 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<language>en-US</language>
	<sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>https://wordpress.org/?v=6.5.8</generator>

 
	<item>
		<title>Roundup of Director Overboarding Policies</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/11/13/roundup-of-director-overboarding-policies/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=roundup-of-director-overboarding-policies</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/11/13/roundup-of-director-overboarding-policies/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 13 Nov 2021 17:22:00 +0000</pubDate>
<!-- 		<dc:creator><![CDATA[]]></dc:creator> -->
				<category><![CDATA[Boards of Directors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Corporate Elections & Voting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Institutional Investors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Institutional voting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Overboarding]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Stewardship]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=141281?d=20211118151410EST</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[As public company board service has become increasingly imperative and time-consuming, proxy advisory firms and institutional investors have sharpened their focus on directors who serve on an excessive number of boards. Overboarding concerns have become a key driver for recommendations or votes against director elections in recent years. For example, in its latest investment stewardship [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Holly Gregory, Rebecca Grapsas, and Claire Holland, Sidley Austin LLP, on Saturday, November 13, 2021 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://www.sidley.com/en/people/g/gregory-holly-j">Holly Gregory</a> is partner, <a href="https://www.sidley.com/en/people/g/grapsas-rebecca">Rebecca Grapsas</a> is counsel, and <a href="https://www.sidley.com/en/people/h/holland-claire-h">Claire Holland</a> is special counsel at Sidley Austin LLP. This post is based on a Sidley memorandum by Ms. Gregory, Ms. Grapsas, Ms. Holland, <a href="https://www.sidley.com/en/people/k/kelsh-john-p">John P. Kelsh</a>, <a href="https://www.sidley.com/en/people/r/reed-andrea-l">Andrea L. Reed</a>, and <a href="https://www.sidley.com/en/people/d/duque-christine">Christine Duque</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>As public company board service has become increasingly imperative and time-consuming, proxy advisory firms and institutional investors have sharpened their focus on directors who serve on an excessive number of boards. Overboarding concerns have become a key driver for recommendations or votes against director elections in recent years. For example, in its latest <a href="https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/publication/2021-voting-spotlight-full-report.pdf">investment stewardship report</a>, BlackRock reported that it voted against 163 directors at 149 companies in the Americas on the basis of overboarding from July 1, 2020 to June 30, 2021.</p>
<p>Public companies must stay informed of the director overboarding policies of their key institutional investors and consider how they may impact director elections and whether the company’s own overboarding limits should be revised in light of policies in place at key investors. The chart below summarizes the overboarding policies of proxy advisory firms Glass Lewis and Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) as well as several large institutional investors.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/11/13/roundup-of-director-overboarding-policies/#more-141281" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Roundup of Director Overboarding Policies">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/11/13/roundup-of-director-overboarding-policies/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>1</slash:comments>
		</item>
	</channel>
</rss>
