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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>What’s “Controversial” About ESG? A Theory of Compelled Commercial Speech under the First Amendment &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>What’s “Controversial” About ESG? A Theory of Compelled Commercial Speech under the First Amendment</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2022/06/17/whats-controversial-about-esg-a-theory-of-compelled-commercial-speech-under-the-first-amendment/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=whats-controversial-about-esg-a-theory-of-compelled-commercial-speech-under-the-first-amendment</link>
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		<pubDate>Fri, 17 Jun 2022 13:27:27 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Accounting & Disclosure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ESG]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Securities Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Climate change]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Disclosure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Environmental disclosure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SEC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Securities enforcement]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Securities regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sustainability]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[The SEC’s proposed climate disclosure rules create an opportunity to reflect on the limits that the First Amendment places upon securities regulation. As regular readers of this blog know, the SEC has proposed rules to make companies disclose their “climate risks” along with their greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions and certain climate-related financial metrics. Unlike existing [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Sean J. Griffith (Fordham Law School), on Friday, June 17, 2022 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://www.fordham.edu/info/23142/sean_j_griffith">Sean J. Griffith</a> is the T.J. Maloney Chair and Professor of Law at Fordham Law School. This post is based on his recent <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4118755">paper</a>.</p>
<p>Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3544978" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance</a> (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/03/02/the-illusory-promise-of-stakeholder-governance/">here</a>) by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita; <a class="external" href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3677155" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener" data-slate-object="inline" data-key="259">For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain</a> (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/08/25/for-whom-corporate-leaders-bargain/" data-slate-object="inline" data-key="262">here</a>) and <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4026803" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener" data-slate-object="inline" data-key="88">Stakeholder Capitalism in the Time of COVID</a> (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2022/02/22/stakeholder-capitalism-in-the-time-of-covid/" data-slate-object="inline" data-key="91">here</a>), both by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita; and <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3749654" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock</a> by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/01/07/restoration-the-role-stakeholder-governance-must-play-in-recreating-a-fair-and-sustainable-american-economy-a-reply-to-professor-rock/">here</a>).</p>
</div></hgroup><p>The SEC’s proposed climate disclosure rules create an opportunity to reflect on the limits that the First Amendment places upon securities regulation. As regular readers of this blog know, the SEC has proposed rules to make companies disclose their “climate risks” along with their greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions and certain climate-related financial metrics. Unlike existing rules, which require disclosure of climate-related matters when they have a material effect on business operations, the proposed rules largely dispense with the concept of materiality and, where they do not disregard it altogether, significantly alter its meaning. These rules thus raise the question of whether there is any limit on the SEC’s ability to impose them and, in particular, whether there is any First Amendment constraint on the SEC’s authority to mandate disclosures.</p>
<p>My paper, <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4118755">What’s &#8220;Controversial&#8221; About ESG? A Theory of Compelled Commercial Speech under the First Amendment</a>, analyzes these questions. It argues that there is indeed a First Amendment limit to SEC action and that the proposed climate rules exceed those limits.</p>
<p>The SEC is, at its core, a regulator of speech. It makes rules about what companies and investors must say to one another. Yet the First Amendment prevents the government from, among other things, “abridging the freedom of speech.” The SEC is part of the government, and it abridges the freedom of speech. So, one wonders, is the SEC unconstitutional?</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2022/06/17/whats-controversial-about-esg-a-theory-of-compelled-commercial-speech-under-the-first-amendment/#more-147325" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading What’s “Controversial” About ESG? A Theory of Compelled Commercial Speech under the First Amendment">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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