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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Paying Well By Paying for Good &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Paying Well By Paying for Good</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2022/06/25/paying-well-by-paying-for-good/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=paying-well-by-paying-for-good</link>
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		<pubDate>Sat, 25 Jun 2022 13:36:54 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Accounting & Disclosure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ESG]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Executive Compensation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Incentives]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Long-Term value]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pay for performance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Performance measures]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SASB]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Stakeholders]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sustainability]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Market practice in the FTSE 100 shows the changing nature of ESG targets in executive pay ESG targets are increasingly prevalent in pay 45% of FTSE 100 companies have an ESG target in the annual bonus, the Long-term Incentive Plan (LTIP), or both 37% use ESG in annual bonus with an average weighting of 15% [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Phillippa O’Connor and Tom Gosling, PricewaterhouseCoopers UK, on Saturday, June 25, 2022 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/contacts/p/Phillippa-O-Connor.html">Phillippa O’Connor</a> is a Reward &amp; Employment Leader at PwC United Kingdom, and <a href="https://www.london.edu/faculty-and-research/faculty-profiles/g/gosling-tom">Tom Gosling</a> is an Executive Fellow in the Department of Finance at London Business School. This post is based on their PwC UK memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4048003" data-slate-object="inline" data-key="134"><span data-slate-object="text" data-key="133">The Perils and Questionable Promise of ESG-Based Compensation</span></a><span data-slate-object="text" data-key="135"> (discussed on the Forum </span><a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2022/03/09/the-perils-and-questionable-promise-of-esg-based-compensation/" data-slate-object="inline" data-key="137"><span data-slate-object="text" data-key="136">here</span></a><span data-slate-object="text" data-key="138" data-slate-fragment="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">) and <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3544978" data-slate-object="inline" data-key="159">The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance</a>, both by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/03/02/the-illusory-promise-of-stakeholder-governance/" data-slate-object="inline" data-key="162">here</a>); and <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3004794" data-slate-object="inline" data-key="184">Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value</a> by Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/09/05/companies-should-maximize-shareholder-welfare-not-market-value/" data-slate-object="inline" data-key="187">here</a>).</span></p>
</div></hgroup><h2>Market practice in the FTSE 100 shows the changing nature of ESG targets in executive pay</h2>
<h3>ESG targets are increasingly prevalent in pay</h3>
<ul>
<li>45% of FTSE 100 companies have an ESG target in the annual bonus, the Long-term Incentive Plan (LTIP), or both</li>
<li>37% use ESG in annual bonus with an average weighting of 15%</li>
<li>19% of the FTSE 100 use ESG in LTIP with an average weighting of 16%</li>
<li>The most common category of measure in the bonus is Social, including measures focusing on diversity, employee engagement, and health &amp; safety</li>
<li>The most common category of measure in the LTIP is Environmental, typically measures focusing on decarbonisation and the energy transition</li>
</ul>
<h3>The nature of ESG targets is changing, with increased use of Environment and Social targets, particularly in LTIPs</h3>
<ul>
<li>ESG targets relating to long-standing social and governance metrics such as health &amp; safety, risk, and employee engagement have appeared in bonuses for some time. 33% of FTSE 100<br />
companies incorporate such &#8220;Old&#8221; ESG measures, 31% in the bonus and 7% in the LTIP</li>
<li>&#8220;New&#8221; ESG targets relate to more recently emerging stakeholder concerns, particularly around<br />
climate change, sustainability and diversity. 28% of companies have such measures, 18% in the bonus and 15% in the LTIP</li>
</ul>
<h3>A slight majority of ESG measures are output rather than input measures, with only a minority operating as an underpin</h3>
<ul>
<li>55% of ESG measures in bonus, and 50% in LTIP, are output measures with a quantifiable goal—for example scope 1 and 2 emissions reductions in tonnes against baseline numbers</li>
<li>31% of ESG measures in bonus, and 27% in LTIP, are input measures relating to specific activities a company undertakes—such as making investments in green energy sources</li>
<li>Only 14% of ESG measures in bonus, and 22% in LTIP, operate as an underpin, despite this<br />
approach being popular with some shareholders</li>
</ul>
<h3>Nearly half of current ESG metrics are not linked to material ESG factors</h3>
<ul>
<li>Over half (55%) of ESG targets are based on ESG dimensions categorised as material to the<br />
company under the SASB Materiality Map®. But equally, nearly half are not</li>
<li>Of the 45% of targets not deemed material in the SASB framework, nearly half (45%) relate to employee engagement or diversity &amp; inclusion—whether this should be deemed immaterial will be a matter of debate. Diversity metrics commonly appear in financial services incentives, following the Women in Finance Initiative</li>
</ul>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2022/06/25/paying-well-by-paying-for-good/#more-146939" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Paying Well By Paying for Good">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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