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	<title>The Proposed SEC Climate Disclosure Rule: A Comment from Scott Hirst &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>The Proposed SEC Climate Disclosure Rule: A Comment from Scott Hirst</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2022/07/11/the-proposed-sec-climate-disclosure-rule-a-comment-from-scott-hirst/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=the-proposed-sec-climate-disclosure-rule-a-comment-from-scott-hirst</link>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 11 Jul 2022 13:26:03 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description><![CDATA[This post is based on a comment letter submitted to the SEC regarding the Proposed SEC Climate Disclosure Rule by Professor Scott Hirst. Below is the text of the letter with minor adjustments to eliminate the correspondence-related parts. This letter (the “Letter”) suggests a simple, but far reaching, change to the Commission’s proposed climate-related disclosure [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Scott Hirst (Boston University), on Monday, July 11, 2022 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a class="external" href="https://www.bu.edu/law/profile/scott-hirst/" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Scott Hirst</a> is Associate Professor of Law at Boston University. This post is based on his comment letter submitted to the SEC regarding the Proposed SEC Climate Disclosure Rule. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3544978" data-slate-object="inline" data-key="251"><span data-slate-object="text" data-key="250">The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance</span></a><span data-slate-object="text" data-key="252"> (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/03/02/the-illusory-promise-of-stakeholder-governance/" data-slate-object="inline" data-key="254">here</a>) and <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3899421" data-slate-object="inline" data-key="286">Will Corporations Deliver Value to All Stakeholders?</a> (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2022/05/23/will-corporations-deliver-value-to-all-stakeholders/">here</a>), both by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita; <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3749654">Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy &#8211; A Reply to Professor Rock</a> (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/01/07/restoration-the-role-stakeholder-governance-must-play-in-recreating-a-fair-and-sustainable-american-economy-a-reply-to-professor-rock/">here</a>) by Leo E. Strine, Jr.; and <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4026803" data-slate-object="inline" data-key="345">Stakeholder Capitalism in the Time of COVID</a>, by Lucian Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2022/02/22/stakeholder-capitalism-in-the-time-of-covid/" data-slate-object="inline" data-key="348">here</a>).</span></p>
</div></hgroup><p>This post is based on a comment letter submitted to the SEC regarding the Proposed SEC Climate Disclosure Rule by Professor Scott Hirst. Below is the text of the letter with minor adjustments to eliminate the correspondence-related parts.</p>
<p>This letter (the “Letter”) suggests a simple, but far reaching, change to the Commission’s proposed climate-related disclosure rule (the “Proposed Rule”): The Commission should let investors in a registrant decide which of the disclosure obligations in the Proposed Rule apply to the registrant. More specifically, the Commission should allow a registrant to opt-out of particular disclosure obligations, if such an opt-out has been approved by a vote of the registrant’s investors. Below I suggest further details on how the opt-out should be structured. I refer to this as an “investor-optional” disclosure rule, in contrast to the Commission’s proposed mandatory disclosure rule.</p>
<p>As I explain further below, the Commission should make the Proposed Rule investor-optional for four main reasons:</p>
<ol>
<li>Investor-optionality is consistent <em>both </em>with the claims of the Commission supporting the Proposed Rule—that investors demand climate disclosure—and those of the Proposed Rule’s critics—that investors do not want climate disclosure, because it would impose additional costs on them, and current disclosure is sufficient for their needs. Letting investors decide whether climate disclosure is appropriate for their protection is the only way to resolve the tension between these two claims.</li>
<li>Making the Proposed Rule investor optional would nullify the strongest attacks on the validity of the Proposed Rule. If these apply at all, they apply only to a mandatory rule. By substantially reducing the likelihood of the Proposed Rule being invalidated, investor-optionality would increase the expected benefit from the Proposed Rule.</li>
<li>Investor-optional climate disclosure would be <em>better for investors </em>than a mandatory rule. In no plausible state of the world would it be worse for investors than a mandatory rule, and in most plausible states of the world it would be better.</li>
<li>Failure to make the Proposed Rule investor-optional would be potential grounds for its invalidation. At a minimum, because investor-optionality is a reasonable alternative, the Administrative Procedure Act requires the Commission to consider it. And because investor-optionality is likely to be better for investors than a mandatory rule, it will be extremely difficult for the Commission to justify implementing a mandatory rule rather than an investor-optional rule. If the Commission did so without adequate justification, its decision would be arbitrary and capricious, and therefore subject to invalidation.</li>
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<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2022/07/11/the-proposed-sec-climate-disclosure-rule-a-comment-from-scott-hirst/#more-147857" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading The Proposed SEC Climate Disclosure Rule: A Comment from Scott Hirst">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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