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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Financial Regulation, Corporate Governance, and the Hidden Costs of Clearinghouses &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Financial Regulation, Corporate Governance, and the Hidden Costs of Clearinghouses</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2022/07/27/financial-regulation-corporate-governance-and-the-hidden-costs-of-clearinghouses/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=financial-regulation-corporate-governance-and-the-hidden-costs-of-clearinghouses</link>
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		<pubDate>Wed, 27 Jul 2022 13:31:07 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Accounting & Disclosure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Derivatives]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Financial Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Clearing houses]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Dodd-Frank Act]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Financial reform]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Financial regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Incentives]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Moral hazard]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Recovery & resolution plans]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Risk]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Skin in the game]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Systemic risk]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Recent financial market events have splashed onto the front pages of newspapers the often-overlooked plumbing found in those markets: the clearinghouses that handle trillions of dollars’ worth of securities and derivatives trades. During the Robinhood and GameStop events, the National Securities Clearing Corporation, a securities clearinghouse, played a critical role when it required Robinhood to provide [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Paolo Saguato (George Mason University), on Wednesday, July 27, 2022 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://www.law.gmu.edu/faculty/directory/fulltime/saguato_paolo">Paolo Saguato</a> is Assistant Professor of Law at George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School. This post is based on his recent <a href="https://ssrn.com/abstract=3269060">article</a>, published in the <em>Ohio State Law Journal.</em></p>
</div></hgroup><p>Recent financial market events have splashed onto the front pages of newspapers the often-overlooked plumbing found in those markets: the clearinghouses that handle trillions of dollars’ worth of securities and derivatives trades. During the Robinhood and GameStop events, the <a href="https://www.dtcc.com/about/businesses-and-subsidiaries/nscc">National Securities Clearing Corporation</a>, a securities clearinghouse, played a critical role when it <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-clearing-demands-grounded-the-wallstreetbets-stocks-for-a-day-11611966092">required</a> Robinhood to provide collateral to guaranty its open positions. And recently, FTX US Derivatives, a cryptocurrency exchange, brought further <a href="https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8535-22">attention</a> to the clearing business and the critical risk mitigation and containment function it provides to the financial system when it <a href="https://www.ftxpolicy.com/posts/risk-management-process-and-the-future-an-update">applied</a> to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission to offer clearing services for non-intermediated <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/dd4db197-cb9b-4f29-b923-9bd94e1e3aed?desktop=true&amp;segmentId=7c8f09b9-9b61-4fbb-9430-9208a9e233c8#myft:notification:daily-email:content">margined crypto derivatives</a>.</p>
<p>Given the magnitude of the trades crisscrossing clearinghouses every day, these vital market infrastructures warrant more scrutiny than they have received. My <a href="https://ssrn.com/abstract=3269060">article</a> calls for policymakers to focus on the existing governance and financial structure of clearinghouses and urges them to seriously address a critical open issue in their organization: the misaligned incentives across clearinghouses’ main stakeholders—particularly their shareholders and their members—and how that misalignment might affect clearinghouses’ risk profile and financial resilience.</p>
<p>Clearinghouses are, in fact, corporations with a unique financial structure. Clearing members are financial institutions that access clearing services. While such members are the ultimate risk bearers of the business, they lack any formal governance rights over the firm. Instead, clearinghouses are controlled by their shareholders, who are large publicly-listed for-profit <a href="https://ssrn.com/abstract=2810819">financial infrastructure groups</a>. These shareholders retain all governance rights, yet have extremely limited financial skin in the game.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2022/07/27/financial-regulation-corporate-governance-and-the-hidden-costs-of-clearinghouses/#more-148571" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Financial Regulation, Corporate Governance, and the Hidden Costs of Clearinghouses">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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