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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>ESG Ratings: A Compass without Direction &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>ESG Ratings: A Compass without Direction</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2022/08/24/esg-ratings-a-compass-without-direction/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=esg-ratings-a-compass-without-direction</link>
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		<pubDate>Wed, 24 Aug 2022 13:32:49 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Accounting & Disclosure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ESG]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Institutional Investors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Disclosure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Environmental disclosure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Proxy advisors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ratings agencies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SASB]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder voting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Stakeholders]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sustainability]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[ESG ratings are intended to provide information to market participants (investors, analysts, and corporate managers) about the relation between corporations and non-investor stakeholders interests. They do so by sifting masses of data to extract insights into various elements of environmental, social, and governance performance and risk. Investors rely on this information to make investment decisions, [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Brian Tayan (Stanford University), on Wednesday, August 24, 2022 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a class="external" href="https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/contact/brian-tayan" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Brian Tayan</a> is a researcher with the Corporate Governance Research Initiative at Stanford Graduate School of Business. This post is based on a recent <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4179647">paper</a> by Mr. Tayan; <a class="external" href="https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/faculty/david-f-larcker" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">David Larcker</a>, Professor of Accounting at Stanford Graduate School of Business; <a href="https://som.yale.edu/faculty/edward-watts">Edward Watts</a>, Assistant Professor of Accounting at Yale School of Management; and <a href="https://som.yale.edu/faculty/lukasz-pomorski">Lukasz Pomorski</a>, Lecturer at Yale School of Management.</p>
<p>Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3544978">The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance</a> (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/03/02/the-illusory-promise-of-stakeholder-governance/">here</a>) and <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3899421">Will Corporations Deliver Value to All Stakeholders?</a> (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2022/05/23/will-corporations-deliver-value-to-all-stakeholders/">here</a>), both by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita; <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3749654">Restoration: The Role Stakeholder Governance Must Play in Recreating a Fair and Sustainable American Economy—A Reply to Professor Rock</a> (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/01/07/restoration-the-role-stakeholder-governance-must-play-in-recreating-a-fair-and-sustainable-american-economy-a-reply-to-professor-rock/">here</a>) by Leo E. Strine, Jr.; and <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4026803">Stakeholder Capitalism in the Time of COVID</a> (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2022/02/22/stakeholder-capitalism-in-the-time-of-covid/">here</a>) by Lucian Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>ESG ratings are intended to provide information to market participants (investors, analysts, and corporate managers) about the relation between corporations and non-investor stakeholders interests. They do so by sifting masses of data to extract insights into various elements of environmental, social, and governance performance and risk. Investors rely on this information to make investment decisions, while corporations use ratings to gain third-party feedback on the quality of their sustainability initiatives.</p>
<p>Recently, ESG ratings providers have come under scrutiny over concerns of the reliability of their assessments. In this post, we examine these concerns. We review the demand for ESG information, the stated objectives of ESG ratings providers, how ratings are determined, the evidence of what they achieve, and structural aspects of the industry that potentially influence ratings. Our purpose is to help companies, investors, and regulators better understand the use of ESG ratings and to highlight areas where they can improve. We find that while ESG ratings providers may convey important insights into the nonfinancial impact of companies, significant shortcomings exist in their objectives, methodologies, and incentives which detract from the informativeness of their assessments.</p>
<h2>Demand for ESG Information</h2>
<p>Demand for ESG information has exploded in recent years. Ten years ago, the term ESG—although in existence—was rarely used by the investment community or in corporate boardrooms. Instead, public and professional interest was focused on the general concepts of corporate responsibility, sustainability, and impact investing. Only recently has the focus on ESG (environmental, social, and governance) as a unique concept come to the forefront and with it an explosion in the demand for information (see Exhibit 1).</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2022/08/24/esg-ratings-a-compass-without-direction/#more-149015" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading ESG Ratings: A Compass without Direction">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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