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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Retaining the C-Suite After CEO Turnover &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Retaining the C-Suite After CEO Turnover</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2025/12/16/retaining-the-c-suite-after-ceo-turnover-2/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=retaining-the-c-suite-after-ceo-turnover-2</link>
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		<pubDate>Tue, 16 Dec 2025 12:32:17 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Board of Directors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[C-suite]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CEOs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NEOs]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[In 2021, FW Cook sought to better understand how companies can effectively retain their C-suite leaders after CEO turnover. Ensuring stability across the leadership team is an important factor in executing proper CEO succession, particularly as it applies to high-value individuals that may have been considered as CEO candidates themselves. Our prior study found that [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Marco Pizzitola, Desmond Pang, and Joe Sorrentino, FW Cook, on Tuesday, December 16, 2025 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;">Marco Pizzitola and Desmond Pang are Consultants, and Joe Sorrentino is a Managing Director at FW Cook. This post is based on their FW Cook report.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>In 2021, FW Cook sought to better understand how companies can effectively retain their C-suite leaders after CEO turnover. Ensuring stability across the leadership team is an important factor in executing proper CEO succession, particularly as it applies to high-value individuals that may have been considered as CEO candidates themselves. Our prior study found that special one-time equity grants made to the leadership team have a strong retention effect in the short term, but that the effect wanes quickly</p>
<p>This year, FW Cook refreshed the study with new data to test for changes in the prevalence or effectiveness of special equity grants as a retention strategy. While the original study focused on CEO turnover events between 2011 and 2015 (and an associated retention period through 2020), this year’s analysis focused on the following five-year window. Further, our updated analysis builds upon the original research by also exploring the retentive value of all outstanding equity awards (i.e., annual and special grants) held by C-suite leaders.</p>
<p>The findings in our updated study are largely aligned with those of the original analysis. Particularly, special equity grants made to non-CEO executives in the wake of CEO turnover continue to show a strong, but limited, retentive effect – typically lasting approximately two to three years. Prevalence and design of such awards remain consistent, although the dollar value of such awards has increased materially.</p>
<p>A new finding identified in this year’s study is that non-CEO executive grants are twice as common when the CEO is an external hire. Lastly, a correlation between total outstanding equity and length of retention was identified, regardless of whether special retention grants were made.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2025/12/16/retaining-the-c-suite-after-ceo-turnover-2/#more-178089" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Retaining the C-Suite After CEO Turnover">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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