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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Chancery Interprets LLC Agreement as Not Eliminating Fiduciary Duties &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Chancery Interprets LLC Agreement as Not Eliminating Fiduciary Duties</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/03/03/chancery-interprets-llc-agreement-as-not-eliminating-fiduciary-duties/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=chancery-interprets-llc-agreement-as-not-eliminating-fiduciary-duties</link>
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		<pubDate>Tue, 03 Mar 2026 12:30:36 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Corporate governance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Delaware cases]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fiduciary duties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[LLCs]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[In Calumet Capital Partners LLC v. Victory Park Capital Advisors LLC (Jan. 29, 2026), the Delaware Court of Chancery, at the pleading stage of litigation, found it reasonably conceivable that, after Victory Park (the “Investor”) invested in Calumet’s lending business (the “Lender”), the Investor—“with and through” its employee, whom it had appointed to the Lender’s board of [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Gail Weinstein, Philip Richter, and Steven Epstein, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP, on Tuesday, March 3, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://www.friedfrank.com/our-people/gail-weinstein" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Gail Weinstein</a> is a Senior Counsel, <a href="https://www.friedfrank.com/our-people/philip-richter" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Philip Richter</a> is a Partner, and <a href="https://www.friedfrank.com/our-people/steven-epstein" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Steven Epstein</a> is the Managing Partner at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver &amp; Jacobson LLP. This post is based on a Fried Frank memorandum by Ms. Weinstein, Mr. Richter, Mr. Epstein, <a href="https://www.friedfrank.com/our-people/steven-steinman" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Steven J. Steinman</a>, <a href="https://www.friedfrank.com/our-people/randi-lally" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Randi Lally</a>, and <a href="https://www.friedfrank.com/our-people/erica-jaffe">Erica Jaffe</a>, and is part of the <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/the-delaware-law-series/">Delaware law series</a>; links to other posts in the series are available <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/the-delaware-law-series/">here</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>In <em>Calumet Capital Partners LLC v. Victory Park Capital Advisors LLC </em>(Jan. 29, 2026), the Delaware Court of Chancery, at the pleading stage of litigation, found it reasonably conceivable that, after Victory Park (the “Investor”) invested in Calumet’s lending business (the “Lender”), the Investor—“with and through” its employee, whom it had appointed to the Lender’s board of managers—engaged in a scheme to undermine the Lender and establish a competing lending business (“Bespoke Capital”). The court interpreted the Lender’s LLC Agreement as not having fully eliminated fiduciary duties for the managers; and found it reasonably inferable from the alleged facts that the Employee, by harming the Lender for the Investor’s benefit, had breached his fiduciary duties to the Lender, aided and abetted by the Investor.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/03/03/chancery-interprets-llc-agreement-as-not-eliminating-fiduciary-duties/#more-179412" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Chancery Interprets LLC Agreement as Not Eliminating Fiduciary Duties">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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