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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Delaware Supreme Court Reverses Moelis &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Delaware Supreme Court Reverses Moelis</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/03/09/delaware-supreme-court-reverses-moelis/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=delaware-supreme-court-reverses-moelis</link>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 09 Mar 2026 11:30:01 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Court of Chancery]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Delaware law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[moelis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Stockholder]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=179481?d=20260306165526EST</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[In Short The Situation: A stockholder sought a judgment declaring that certain provisions of a stockholders agreement were facially invalid and unenforceable under 8 Del. C. § 141(a). The Court of Chancery found that the plaintiff&#8217;s claims were timely and that the stockholders agreement violated Delaware law. The Result: The Delaware Supreme Court held that the challenged provisions, to the [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Walter Davis, Randi Lesnick, and Marjorie Duffy, Jones Day, on Monday, March 9, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://www.jonesday.com/en/lawyers/d/walter-davis?tab=overview">Walter Davis</a> and <a href="https://www.jonesday.com/en/lawyers/d/marjorie-duffy?tab=overview">Marjorie Duffy</a> are Partners, and <a style="font-size: 10pt;" href="https://www.jonesday.com/en/lawyers/l/randi-lesnick?tab=overview">Randi Lesnick</a><span style="font-size: 10pt;"> is a Co-Chair of the Corporate Practice </span><span style="font-size: 10pt;">at Jones Day. This post is based on a Jones Day memorandum by Mr. Davis, Ms. Duffy, </span><span style="font-size: 10pt;">Ms. Lesnick, </span><a style="font-size: 10pt;" href="https://www.jonesday.com/en/lawyers/m/joel-may?tab=overview">Joel May</a><span style="font-size: 10pt;">, and </span><a style="font-size: 10pt;" href="https://www.jonesday.com/en/lawyers/l/jennifer-lewis?tab=overview">Jennifer Lewis</a><span style="font-size: 10pt;">, </span><span style="font-size: 10pt;">and is part of the </span><a style="font-size: 10pt;" href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/the-delaware-law-series/">Delaware law series</a><span style="font-size: 10pt;">; links to other posts in the series are available </span><a style="font-size: 10pt;" href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/the-delaware-law-series/">here</a><span style="font-size: 10pt;">.</span></p>
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<h2>In Short</h2>
<p><strong>The Situation:</strong> A stockholder sought a judgment declaring that certain provisions of a stockholders agreement were facially invalid and unenforceable under 8 Del. C. § 141(a). The Court of Chancery found that the plaintiff&#8217;s claims were timely and that the stockholders agreement violated Delaware law.</p>
<p><strong>The Result:</strong> The Delaware Supreme Court held that the challenged provisions, to the extent they conflict with the managerial authority of the board conferred by § 141(a), were voidable (not void) and that the plaintiff unreasonably delayed in asserting its challenge to those provisions.</p>
<p><strong>Looking Ahead:</strong> The Court of Chancery&#8217;s decision was the catalyst for the 2024 amendments to § 122(18), which resolved market uncertainty in the wake of that decision. The Delaware Supreme Court&#8217;s decision provides another measure of certainty by making clear that a plaintiff&#8217;s facial challenges to voidable acts must be timely brought.</p>
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<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/03/09/delaware-supreme-court-reverses-moelis/#more-179481" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Delaware Supreme Court Reverses Moelis">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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