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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>CEO Tenure is More Important than the CEO-Chair Debate &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>CEO Tenure is More Important than the CEO-Chair Debate</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/03/10/ceo-tenure-is-more-important-than-the-ceo-chair-debate/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=ceo-tenure-is-more-important-than-the-ceo-chair-debate</link>
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		<pubDate>Tue, 10 Mar 2026 11:32:30 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Board of Directors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Board tenure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CEOs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Corporate governance]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[In governance circles, few topics generate more debate than whether the CEO should also serve as board chair. Regulators in some markets have taken firm positions, and activists often argue that separation between the two roles is a universal best practice. But the empirical evidence tells a different story: serving as both chair and CEO [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Victoria Tellez, FCLTGlobal, on Tuesday, March 10, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://www.fcltglobal.org/team-member/victoria-tellez/" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Victoria Tellez</a> is the Research Director at FCLTGlobal. This post is based on her FCLTGlobal memorandum.</p>
</div></hgroup><div>
<p><span style="font-size: 10pt;">In governance circles, few topics generate more debate than whether the CEO should also serve as board chair. Regulators in some markets have taken firm positions, and activists often argue that separation between the two roles is a universal best practice.</span></p>
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<p><main id="resource-main">But the empirical evidence tells a different story: serving as both chair and CEO is not inherently good or bad – in fact, CEOs who hold both roles tend to remain in office longer, by an average of three years, than peers who do not.</main>The more consequential issue is not formal structure, but how boards design leadership and oversight in an environment of shorter CEO tenures. As leadership cycles compress, the risk to long-term value lies in repeated strategic resets, erosion of institutional memory, and underinvestment in long-term priorities.</p>
<p>For boards and executives, the key is not conforming to a governance trend or reacting to external pressure. It is choosing a structure that fits the company’s long-term needs, explaining that choice transparently, and ensuring the board has the expertise, independence, and processes to govern effectively, regardless of who holds the gavel.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/03/10/ceo-tenure-is-more-important-than-the-ceo-chair-debate/#more-179473" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading CEO Tenure is More Important than the CEO-Chair Debate">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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