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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Engines of External Governance &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Engines of External Governance</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/03/30/engines-of-external-governance/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=engines-of-external-governance</link>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 30 Mar 2026 11:31:17 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Corporate governance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ESG]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nonprofits]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder activism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Stakeholder]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Who are the pivotal actors and interests shaping corporate governance? Traditional accounts focus on shareholders, directors, and officers, and treat corporate governance as largely an intra-firm issue of power, incentives, and monitoring. Recent scholarship has expanded this view by identifying additional actors and forces, including the diverse constituents of the U.S. “corporate governance machine” (such as [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Mariana Pargendler (Harvard Law School) and Elizabeth Pollman (University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School), on Monday, March 30, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://hls.harvard.edu/faculty/mariana-pargendler/">Mariana Pargendler</a> is the Beneficial Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and <a href="https://www.law.upenn.edu/faculty/epollman">Elizabeth Pollman</a> is the Perry Golkin Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School. This post is based on their recent <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=6377439">article</a>, forthcoming in the <em>Georgetown Law Journal</em>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>Who are the pivotal actors and interests shaping corporate governance? Traditional accounts focus on shareholders, directors, and officers, and treat corporate governance as largely an intra-firm issue of power, incentives, and monitoring. Recent scholarship has expanded this view by identifying additional actors and forces, including the diverse constituents of the U.S. “<a href="https://columbialawreview.org/content/the-corporate-governance-machine/">corporate governance machine</a>” (such as proxy advisors, stock exchanges, stock indices, and ratings agencies), as well as international organizations that have propelled “<a href="https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6544&amp;context=law_lawreview">the rise of international corporate law</a>.” Other commonly identified influences include <a href="https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/4320/">corporate gadflies</a>, <a href="https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4812&amp;context=flr">the state as a shareholder</a>, and broader political-economic forces such as <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691026312/strong-managers-weak-owners?srsltid=AfmBOoqgk_AjVh7y2El9U5wdPizXqou5-O5a9O5Ag2BRkNo3mHpAMdho">populism</a>, <a href="https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol95/iss2/5/">nationalism</a>, and <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14735970.2025.2549601">geopolitics</a>.</p>
<p>These accounts, however, often leave out an important part of the picture: the role of nonprofits in shaping corporate governance. In our Article, <em><a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=6377439">Engines of External Governance</a></em>, we examine how nonprofits have become key drivers of external governance—the ways in which actors outside the firm seek to embed broader objectives into corporate decision-making. Bringing nonprofits into focus sheds critical light on corporate governance developments and their trajectory.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/03/30/engines-of-external-governance/#more-179909" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Engines of External Governance">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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