<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/"
	>

<channel>
	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
	<atom:link href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/04/16/agent-washing-disclosure-risks-in-the-emerging-market-for-ai-agents/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu</link>
	<description>The leading online blog in the fields of corporate governance and financial regulation.</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Sun, 19 Apr 2026 11:30:34 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<language>en-US</language>
	<sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>https://wordpress.org/?v=6.5.8</generator>

 
	<item>
		<title>Agent Washing: Disclosure Risks in the Emerging Market for AI Agents</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/04/16/agent-washing-disclosure-risks-in-the-emerging-market-for-ai-agents/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=agent-washing-disclosure-risks-in-the-emerging-market-for-ai-agents</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/04/16/agent-washing-disclosure-risks-in-the-emerging-market-for-ai-agents/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 16 Apr 2026 11:32:29 +0000</pubDate>
<!-- 		<dc:creator><![CDATA[]]></dc:creator> -->
				<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[agent washing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI agents]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI Washing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[disclosure risk]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=180286?d=20260415155500EDT</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Key Takeaways: “Agent washing” creates heightened securities disclosure risk beyond traditional AI washing. As companies increasingly market “AI agents” as drivers of growth and efficiency, imprecise or inflated claims about autonomy, functionality, or business impact are more easily testable—and therefore more vulnerable to scrutiny by regulators, plaintiffs, and investors. Public statements tying agentic AI to [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Charu Chandrasekhar, Ben Pedersen, and Paul Rodel, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, on Thursday, April 16, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://www.debevoise.com/charuchandrasekhar">Charu Chandrasekhar</a>, <a href="https://www.debevoise.com/benjaminpedersen">Ben Pedersen</a>, and <a href="https://www.debevoise.com/paulrodel">Paul Rodel</a> are Partners at Debevoise &amp; Plimpton LLP. This post is based on a Debevoise memorandum by Ms. Chandrasekhar, Mr. Pedersen, Mr. Rodel, and <a href="https://www.debevoise.com/avigesser">Avi Gesser</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>Key Takeaways:</p>
<ul>
<li>“Agent washing” creates heightened securities disclosure risk beyond traditional AI washing. As companies increasingly market “AI agents” as drivers of growth and efficiency, imprecise or inflated claims about autonomy, functionality, or business impact are more easily testable—and therefore more vulnerable to scrutiny by regulators, plaintiffs, and investors. Public statements tying agentic AI to revenue, productivity, or operational outcomes should be carefully substantiated and aligned with actual system capabilities.</li>
<li>Under-disclosure of agent-related risks may be as problematic as overstatement. Even where companies are genuinely deploying AI agents, failing to adequately disclose material limitations – such as reliability issues, human oversight requirements, cybersecurity exposure, or auditability gaps – can create liability. Given agents’ ability to take autonomous or semi-autonomous actions across systems, companies should ensure risk factors and MD&amp;A disclosures accurately reflect the evolving operational and control risks associated with these tools.</li>
</ul>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/04/16/agent-washing-disclosure-risks-in-the-emerging-market-for-ai-agents/#more-180286" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Agent Washing: Disclosure Risks in the Emerging Market for AI Agents">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/04/16/agent-washing-disclosure-risks-in-the-emerging-market-for-ai-agents/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
	</channel>
</rss>
