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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>How a Buyer&#8217;s AI Conversations Sank Its Earnout Avoidance Strategy &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>How a Buyer&#8217;s AI Conversations Sank Its Earnout Avoidance Strategy</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/04/20/how-a-buyers-ai-conversations-sank-its-earnout-avoidance-strategy/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=how-a-buyers-ai-conversations-sank-its-earnout-avoidance-strategy</link>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 20 Apr 2026 11:32:49 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Delaware Law Series]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[delaware]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Delaware Court of Chancery]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[EPA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fortis Advisors v Krafton]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[gaming]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Subnautica]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[On March 16, 2026, the Delaware Court of Chancery issued a significant post-trial opinion in Fortis Advisors, LLC v. Krafton, Inc. The case arose from Krafton, Inc.’s (the “Buyer”) acquisition of Unknown Worlds Entertainment (the “Target”), and the Buyer’s subsequent attempt to engineer its way out of a $250 million earnout obligation. The court found [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Jonathan A. Dhanawade, Frank J. Favia Jr., and Andrew J. Stanger, Mayer Brown LLP, on Monday, April 20, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/people/d/jonathan-dhanawade">Jonathan A. Dhanawade</a> and <a href="https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/people/f/frank-favia-jr">Frank J. Favia Jr.</a> are Partners and <a href="https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/people/s/stanger-andrew-j">Andrew J. Stanger</a> is Knowledge Counsel at Mayer Brown LLP. This post is based on their Mayer Brown memorandum and is part of the <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/the-delaware-law-series/">Delaware law series</a>; links to other posts in the series are available <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/the-delaware-law-series/">here</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>On March 16, 2026, the Delaware Court of Chancery issued a significant post-trial opinion in <em>Fortis Advisors, LLC v. Krafton, Inc</em>.<a class="footnote" id="1b" href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/04/20/how-a-buyers-ai-conversations-sank-its-earnout-avoidance-strategy/#1">[1]</a> The case arose from Krafton, Inc.’s (the “Buyer”) acquisition of Unknown Worlds Entertainment (the “Target”), and the Buyer’s subsequent attempt to engineer its way out of a $250 million earnout obligation. The court found that the Buyer breached the parties’ Equity Purchase Agreement (the “EPA”) by terminating the Target’s three key executives without (contractually defined) “Cause” and by seizing operational control of the studio. In a sweeping remedial order, the court reinstated the Target’s CEO to his position with full operational authority, enjoined the Buyer from using the studio’s own board to circumvent that authority, restored the Target’s access to its publishing platform, and equitably extended the earnout measurement period by 258 days. Perhaps most remarkably, the court quoted at length from responses generated by a popular AI platform in response to queries made by the Buyer’s CEO about how to take control of the Target’s operations.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/04/20/how-a-buyers-ai-conversations-sank-its-earnout-avoidance-strategy/#more-180289" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading How a Buyer&#8217;s AI Conversations Sank Its Earnout Avoidance Strategy">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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