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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>What Do Investors Learn in Private Meetings? Evidence from 4,700 Encounters with Portfolio Firms &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>What Do Investors Learn in Private Meetings? Evidence from 4,700 Encounters with Portfolio Firms</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/04/21/what-do-investors-learn-in-private-meetings-evidence-from-4700-encounters-with-portfolio-firms/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=what-do-investors-learn-in-private-meetings-evidence-from-4700-encounters-with-portfolio-firms</link>
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		<pubDate>Tue, 21 Apr 2026 11:31:04 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Activism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Corporate governance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Institutional Investors]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Private meetings between institutional investors and the boards and management of their portfolio firms have grown substantially worldwide as investors comply with stewardship codes and engage in active ownership. At the same time, these meetings are frequently undisclosed, raising concerns about fair disclosure and insider trading. While prior research has studied investor engagement through the [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Marco Becht (Université Libre de Bruxelles), Julian Franks (London Business School), and Hannes F. Wagner (Bocconi University), on Tuesday, April 21, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://ulb.academia.edu/MarcoBecht">Marco Becht</a> is a Professor of Finance at Solvay Brussels School, Université Libre de Bruxelles; <a href="https://www.london.edu/faculty-and-research/faculty-profiles/f/franks-jr">Julian Franks</a> is a Professor of Finance at London Business School; and <a href="https://finance.unibocconi.eu/faculty/hannes-wagner">Hannes F. Wagner</a> is a Professor of Finance at Bocconi University. This post is based on their recent <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/jofi.13495?campaign=wolearlyview">article</a>, forthcoming in the <em>Journal of Finance</em>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>Private meetings between institutional investors and the boards and management of their portfolio firms have grown substantially worldwide as investors comply with stewardship codes and engage in active ownership. At the same time, these meetings are frequently undisclosed, raising concerns about fair disclosure and insider trading. While prior research has studied investor engagement through the lens of <span lang="IT"><a href="https://academic.oup.com/rfs/article-abstract/22/8/3093/1589687"><span lang="EN-US">activist campaigns</span></a></span> or <span lang="IT"><a href="https://academic.oup.com/rfs/article/30/9/2933/3852480"><span lang="EN-US">global activism patterns</span></a></span>, little is known about the day-to-day private interactions between mainstream asset managers and their portfolio companies. In our paper, <span lang="IT"><a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jofi.13495"><span lang="EN-US">The Benefits of Access: Evidence from Private Meetings with Portfolio Firms</span></a></span>, forthcoming in the <em>Journal of Finance</em>, we use large language models (LLMs) to analyze the content of 4,700 private meetings between a large active asset manager and its portfolio firms and examine how the information obtained in these meetings affects trading decisions and performance.</p>
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