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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Chancery Finds Investment Manager&#8217;s Board May Have Breached Fiduciary Duties, Aided and Abetted by the Buyer &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Chancery Finds Investment Manager&#8217;s Board May Have Breached Fiduciary Duties, Aided and Abetted by the Buyer</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/05/04/chancery-finds-investment-managers-board-may-have-breached-fiduciary-duties-aided-and-abetted-by-the-buyer/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=chancery-finds-investment-managers-board-may-have-breached-fiduciary-duties-aided-and-abetted-by-the-buyer</link>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 04 May 2026 11:30:59 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Delaware Law Series]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[assets]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[delaware]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Delaware Court of Chancery]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fiduciary duties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[investment managers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[YWCA v. Hatteras Funds]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=180656?d=20260501161146EDT</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[In YWCA of Rochester and Monroe Cty. v. Hatteras Funds (Mar. 27, 2026), the Delaware Court of Chancery, at the pleading stage of litigation, found that an investment manager (serving as a general partner of the master fund of a group of closed-end, registered investment funds), its controller, and its directors may have breached their fiduciary duties [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Gail Weinstein, Philip Richter, and Steven Epstein, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP, on Monday, May 4, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://www.friedfrank.com/our-people/gail-weinstein" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Gail Weinstein</a> is a Senior Counsel, <a href="https://www.friedfrank.com/our-people/philip-richter" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Philip Richter</a> is a Partner, and <a href="https://www.friedfrank.com/our-people/steven-epstein" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Steven Epstein</a> is the Managing Partner at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver &amp; Jacobson LLP. This post is based on a Fried Frank memorandum by Ms. Weinstein, Mr. Richter, Mr. Epstein, <a href="https://www.friedfrank.com/our-people/steven-steinman">Steven Steinman</a>, <a href="https://www.friedfrank.com/our-people/colum-weiden">Colum Weiden</a>, and <a href="https://www.friedfrank.com/our-people/roy-tannenbaum">Roy Tannenbaum</a>; and is part of the <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/the-delaware-law-series/">Delaware law series</a>; links to other posts in the series are available <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/the-delaware-law-series/">here</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>In <em>YWCA of Rochester and Monroe Cty. v. Hatteras Funds</em> (Mar. 27, 2026), the Delaware Court of Chancery, at the pleading stage of litigation, found that an investment manager (serving as a general partner of the master fund of a group of closed-end, registered investment funds), its controller, and its directors may have breached their fiduciary duties in connection with the sale of all of the assets of the master fund, aided and abetted by the buyer. The limited partnership agreement provided that the directors had the same duties as directors of a Delaware corporation. Four of the five directors were purportedly independent directors.</p>
<p>The court held that the plaintiff’s allegations supported a reasonable inference that the defendants breached their fiduciary duties when: (i) to solve liquidity issues, they approved the asset sale, in which the master fund’s diversified portfolio of investments was exchanged for illiquid securities of a problematic buyer, in violation of the fund’s diversification policy; (ii) after the asset sale, and without informing the limited partners, they failed to pursue a dissolution plan they had contemplated as a second-step to the asset sale; and (iii) after the asset sale, they continued to pay the investment manager the same 1% management fee although it then managed only a single asset (and, moreover, allegedly did little or nothing to manage that asset). Also, the court held that the buyer may have aided and abetted the breaches of fiduciary duties by the investment manager and its controller, as the buyer, allegedly, committed that it would financially support their efforts to create new funds, which created a conflict of interest for them.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/05/04/chancery-finds-investment-managers-board-may-have-breached-fiduciary-duties-aided-and-abetted-by-the-buyer/#more-180656" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Chancery Finds Investment Manager&#8217;s Board May Have Breached Fiduciary Duties, Aided and Abetted by the Buyer">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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