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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Control Issues: Delaware Holds Parties to Their Bargain in Recent Governance Decisions &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Control Issues: Delaware Holds Parties to Their Bargain in Recent Governance Decisions</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/05/12/control-issues-delaware-holds-parties-to-their-bargain-in-recent-governance-decisions/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=control-issues-delaware-holds-parties-to-their-bargain-in-recent-governance-decisions</link>
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		<pubDate>Tue, 12 May 2026 11:30:26 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Delaware Law Series]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Contract Law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[delaware]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Delaware Corporate Law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Delaware Court of Chancery]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fiduciary duties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[LLC Deadlock]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[M&A]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[mergers and acquisitions]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Delaware is widely known as a “contractarian” state when it comes to corporate law, upholding freedom of contract principles for sophisticated parties. That bias was on display in three recent post-trial Court of Chancery decisions involving control and governance of closely held Delaware companies: In Ropko et al. v. McNeill, Jr., the Court held that an [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Adam Magid, Douglas Mo, and Peter Bariso, Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, on Tuesday, May 12, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://www.cadwalader.com/professionals/adam-magid">Adam Magid</a> and <a href="https://www.cadwalader.com/professionals/peter-bariso">Peter Bariso</a> are Partners and <a href="https://www.cadwalader.com/professionals/doug-mo">Douglas Mo</a> is an Associate at Cadwalader, Wickersham &amp; Taft LLP. This post is based on their Cadwalader memorandum and is part of the <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/the-delaware-law-series/">Delaware law series</a>; links to other posts in the series are available <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/the-delaware-law-series/">here</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>Delaware is widely known as a “contractarian” state when it comes to corporate law, upholding freedom of contract principles for sophisticated parties. That bias was on display in three recent post-trial Court of Chancery decisions involving control and governance of closely held Delaware companies:</p>
<ul>
<li>In <em>Ropko et al. v. McNeill, Jr</em>., <a class="footnote" id="1b" href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/05/12/control-issues-delaware-holds-parties-to-their-bargain-in-recent-governance-decisions/#1">[1]</a> the Court held that an LLC manager could not turn a voting agreement—requiring the other managers to vote in lockstep—into unrestricted authority to remove them by unilateral written consent.</li>
<li>In <em>Fortis Advisors, LLC v. Krafton</em>, Inc., <a class="footnote" id="2b" href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/05/12/control-issues-delaware-holds-parties-to-their-bargain-in-recent-governance-decisions/#2">[2]</a> the Court rejected a buyer’s attempt to seize control of the target company by fabricating grounds to terminate its founders for “Cause.”</li>
<li>In <em>In re Priority Responsible Funding LLC</em>, <a class="footnote" id="3b" href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/05/12/control-issues-delaware-holds-parties-to-their-bargain-in-recent-governance-decisions/#3">[3]</a> the Court declined to permit one of two co-managing members to keep a deadlocked LLC afloat because the operating agreement lacked a tiebreaker mechanism.</li>
</ul>
<p>Together, these decisions highlight that, when control and governance are in dispute, Delaware courts will enforce not only the rights parties grant—but the constraints and gaps they accept.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/05/12/control-issues-delaware-holds-parties-to-their-bargain-in-recent-governance-decisions/#more-180852" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Control Issues: Delaware Holds Parties to Their Bargain in Recent Governance Decisions">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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