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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Not New: A Response to Claims About &#8220;New Control&#8221; in Control and its Discontents &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Not New: A Response to Claims About &#8220;New Control&#8221; in Control and its Discontents</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/05/13/not-new-a-response-to-claims-about-new-control-in-control-and-its-discontents/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=not-new-a-response-to-claims-about-new-control-in-control-and-its-discontents</link>
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		<pubDate>Wed, 13 May 2026 11:31:16 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Delaware Law Series]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Controlling Stockholder Doctrine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[delaware]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Delaware Corporate Jurisprudence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Entire Fairness Review]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fiduciary duties]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Transactional Control]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[“Amicus Plato, sed magis amica veritas.” In translation, “Plato is my friend, but truth is a greater friend.” That sentiment, attributed to Aristotle, captures my response to Control and its Discontents, an article by Professors Jill E. Fisch and Steven Davidoff Solomon. Both are distinguished scholars whom I respect and whose work I often cite. [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Hon. J. Travis Laster, Delaware Court of Chancery, on Wednesday, May 13, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;">The Honorable <a href="https://courts.delaware.gov/chancery/judges.aspx">J. Travis Laster</a> is Vice Chancellor at the Delaware Court of Chancery. This post is based on his <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=6604058">paper</a> and is part of the <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/the-delaware-law-series/">Delaware law series</a>; links to other posts in the series are available <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/the-delaware-law-series/">here</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>“<em>Amicus Plato, sed magis amica veritas</em>.” In translation, “Plato is my friend, but truth is a greater friend.” That sentiment, attributed to Aristotle, captures my response to <em>Control and its Discontents</em>, an article by Professors Jill E. Fisch and Steven Davidoff Solomon. Both are distinguished scholars whom I respect and whose work I often cite. But productive academic engagement requires dealing forthrightly with precedent, and <em>Discontents</em> does not.</p>
<p><em>Discontents</em> asserts that three recent Delaware decisions—<em>Match</em>, <em>Sears Hometown</em>, and <em>Tornetta</em>—marked a sea change in Delaware law by taking a novel and theoretically unjustified approach to controlling stockholders. On that premise, <em>Discontents</em> urges a return to what the article characterizes as traditional limits on judicial oversight of controlling stockholders. <em>Discontents</em> argues that Delaware courts historically (1) only applied entire fairness to controlling-stockholder freeze-outs and asset sales, (2) always exempted stockholder-level conduct by controlling stockholders (such as voting and selling) from fiduciary review, and (3) confined findings of non-majority control to stockholders with a near majority of the voting power. <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/05/13/not-new-a-response-to-claims-about-new-control-in-control-and-its-discontents/#more-180964" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Not New: A Response to Claims About &#8220;New Control&#8221; in Control and its Discontents">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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