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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>The Impact of SEC Punting &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>The Impact of SEC Punting</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/05/27/the-impact-of-sec-punting/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=the-impact-of-sec-punting</link>
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		<pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 11:31:31 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[No-action letters]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Proxy season]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SEC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SEC regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder activism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder proposals]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[For decades, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) acted as the de facto arbiter of Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the federal securities rule governing shareholder proposals. The rule gives shareholders a procedure for proposing ballot items for corporate elections and outlines specific procedural and substantive grounds on which management can [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Anna Toniolo (Harvard Law School), on Wednesday, May 27, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;">Anna Toniolo is a Fellow at the Harvard Law School Program on Corporate Governance and an S.J.D. candidate at Harvard Law School. This post is based on her recent <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=6832665">paper</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>For decades, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) acted as the de facto arbiter of Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the federal securities rule governing shareholder proposals. The rule gives shareholders a procedure for proposing ballot items for corporate elections and outlines specific procedural and substantive grounds on which management can lawfully exclude a proposal. The SEC used to referee this process by allowing companies to apply for “no-action” letters that effectively blessed their decisions to exclude proposals from their ballots. But in November 2025, the Commission <a href="https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/statement-regarding-division-corporation-finances-role-exchange-act-rule-14a-8-process-current-proxy-season">announced</a> that it would no longer issue such letters, leaving companies to interpret the rules for themselves.</p>
<p>My new paper, <em>The Impact of SEC Punting</em>, compares proposal activity at S&amp;P 1500 companies during the 2025 and 2026 proxy seasons to analyze how companies and shareholders have responded to the SEC’s decision to stop refereeing shareholder proposal disputes.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/05/27/the-impact-of-sec-punting/#more-181440" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading The Impact of SEC Punting">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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