The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu The leading online blog in the fields of corporate governance and financial regulation. Fri, 29 May 2026 11:32:14 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.5.8 https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/cropped-photography-4-e1706898544564-1-32x32.png From Scorched Earth to Mars: Corporate Governance Goes Rogue in 2026 – The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu 32 32 From Scorched Earth to Mars: Corporate Governance Goes Rogue in 2026 https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/05/29/from-scorched-earth-to-mars-corporate-governance-goes-rogue-in-2026/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=from-scorched-earth-to-mars-corporate-governance-goes-rogue-in-2026 https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/05/29/from-scorched-earth-to-mars-corporate-governance-goes-rogue-in-2026/#respond Fri, 29 May 2026 11:32:14 +0000 https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=181514?d=20260528140217EDT Posted by Michael Garland, New York City Office of the Comptroller, on Friday, May 29, 2026
Editor's Note:

Michael Garland is Assistant Comptroller for Corporate Governance and Responsible Investment in the Office of New York City Comptroller Mark Levine.

Something fundamental shifted during the 2026 proxy season. Reacting to the SEC’s “hands-off” approach, boards deployed increasingly aggressive procedural strategies to evade accountability. That several of the New York City Pension Funds had to sue AT&T simply to secure a vote on a shareholder proposal illustrates how far the process has shifted.

The SEC’s retreat from the traditional no-action process stands at the heart of this storm—inequitably favoring management and impairing shareholders’ ability to advance shareholder proposals. Indeed, while shareholders have thus far been forced to litigate just to have their proposals voted on, the SEC staff granted Exxon Mobil Corporation (“Exxon”) no-action relief on its unprecedented (and potentially industry-defining) retail voting program with seemingly minimal scrutiny. As the public record shows, Exxon’s retail voting program, which is now facing legal challenges in federal court, received no-action relief from the SEC on the very day it was requested.[1]

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