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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Three Things the Commission Could Do for European Shareholder Democracy &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Three Things the Commission Could Do for European Shareholder Democracy</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/02/three-things-the-commission-could-do-for-european-shareholder-democracy/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=three-things-the-commission-could-do-for-european-shareholder-democracy</link>
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		<pubDate>Tue, 02 Jun 2026 13:14:25 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Asset management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[pass-through voting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Proxy voting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Retail investors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[shareholder democracy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder Rights Directive]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[There is a version of the next decade in which tens of millions of European investors — pension members, retail fund holders, beneficiaries of insurance products — routinely direct the votes attached to the shares their capital ultimately funds. The technology exists and is in use. The demand is real and growing on both the [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Georgia Stewart, Tumelo, on Tuesday, June 2, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;">Georgia Stewart is CEO of Tumelo. This post is based on Tumelo’s response to the European Commission’s 2026 Call for Evidence on the Update of the Rules on Shareholder Rights.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>There is a version of the next decade in which tens of millions of European investors — pension members, retail fund holders, beneficiaries of insurance products — routinely direct the votes attached to the shares their capital ultimately funds. The technology exists and is in use. The demand is real and growing on both the institutional and the retail side. What stands between the present and that future is not innovation or appetite; it is a small number of specific points in the regulatory architecture where a targeted intervention would convert a patchwork of pioneering programmes into infrastructure that scales.</p>
<p>It is in that spirit which our company, Tumelo, has just responded to the European Commission’s Call for Evidence on the update of the Shareholder Rights Directive. We operate the pass-through voting platform that sits behind a number of major asset managers and the asset owners who invest with them — six fund managers globally, more than twenty-five asset owners, and over £300 billion in assets. We see, every day, where things work and where they catch. From that vantage point, the SRD review is a real opportunity. A handful of carefully chosen unlocks could expand the franchise of European shareholder democracy by an order of magnitude. Our written response to the Commission sets out a number of these. In this post we focus on three that, taken together, illustrate the kind of intervention we hope for.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/02/three-things-the-commission-could-do-for-european-shareholder-democracy/#more-181411" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Three Things the Commission Could Do for European Shareholder Democracy">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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