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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Corporate M&#038;As and Labor Market Concentration: Efficiency Gains or Power Grabs? &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Corporate M&#038;As and Labor Market Concentration: Efficiency Gains or Power Grabs?</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/08/corporate-mas-and-labor-market-concentration-efficiency-gains-or-power-grabs/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=corporate-mas-and-labor-market-concentration-efficiency-gains-or-power-grabs</link>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 08 Jun 2026 11:32:22 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Antitrust Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Labor Market Concentration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Labor Productivity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mergers & acquisitions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Monopsony Power]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder value]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Mergers and acquisitions reshape not only the product markets that firms operate in, but also the labor markets where firms compete for workers. When two firms that compete for labor merge, labor market concentration can increase substantially. This raises an important and increasingly policy-relevant question: do mergers create value by improving labor efficiency, or by [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by David Cicero (Auburn University), Mo Shen (Auburn University), and Jaideep Shenoy (University of Connecticut School of Business), on Monday, June 8, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://harbert.auburn.edu/directory/david-cicero.html">David Cicero</a> is a Professor of Finance and <a href="https://harbert.auburn.edu/directory/mo-shen.html">Mo Shen</a> is an Associate Professor of Finance at Auburn University’s Harbert College of Business; and <a href="https://www.business.uconn.edu/person/jaideep-shenoy/">Jaideep Shenoy</a> is an Associate Professor of Finance at the University of Connecticut School of Business. This post is based on their recent <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3990297">article</a>, forthcoming in the <em>Journal of Finance.</em></p>
</div></hgroup><p>Mergers and acquisitions reshape not only the product markets that firms operate in, but also the labor markets where firms compete for workers. When two firms that compete for labor merge, labor market concentration can increase substantially. This raises an important and increasingly policy-relevant question: do mergers create value by improving labor efficiency, or by increasing employers’ power over workers?</p>
<p>The issue has become central to modern antitrust debates. The <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/2023_merger_guidelines_final_12.18.2023.pdf">2023 Merger Guidelines</a> issued by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission explicitly recognize labor market effects as a key dimension of merger review. Policymakers and scholars have increasingly expressed concern that mergers may create monopsony power in labor markets, allowing firms to suppress wages or reduce employment opportunities for workers. At the same time, mergers may generate legitimate labor efficiency gains through workforce integration. <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/08/corporate-mas-and-labor-market-concentration-efficiency-gains-or-power-grabs/#more-181671" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Corporate M&#038;As and Labor Market Concentration: Efficiency Gains or Power Grabs?">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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