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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>The 2026 Proxy Season in Progress &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>The 2026 Proxy Season in Progress</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/13/the-2026-proxy-season-in-progress/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=the-2026-proxy-season-in-progress</link>
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		<pubDate>Sat, 13 Jun 2026 11:30:23 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Board of Directors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Executive Compensation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[executive pay]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[investor stewardship]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Proxy advisors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Say on pay]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder voting]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Introduction At first blush, this appears to be just another proxy season. The overall failure rates for the Russell 3000 and S&#38;P 500 companies in Say on Pay, director election, and equity plan proposal votes remain low. Vote results are roughly in line with recent historical outcomes, and proxy advisors and large investor stewardship groups [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Blair Jones, Austin Vanbastelaer, and Nathan Grantz, Semler Brossy, on Saturday, June 13, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://semlerbrossy.com/team/blair-jones/">Blair Jones</a> and <a href="https://semlerbrossy.com/team/austin-vanbastelaer/">Austin Vanbastelaer</a> are Managing Directors and <a href="https://semlerbrossy.com/team/nathan-grantz/">Nathan Grantz</a> is a Consultant at Semler Brossy.</p>
</div></hgroup><h3>Introduction</h3>
<p>At first blush, this appears to be just another proxy season. The overall failure rates for the Russell 3000 and S&amp;P 500 companies in Say on Pay, director election, and equity plan proposal votes remain low. Vote results are roughly in line with recent historical outcomes, and proxy advisors and large investor stewardship groups largely align on the pay-related topics that should receive low vote support. Some may have anticipated greater disruption, given that the leading proxy advisory firms, ISS and Glass Lewis, have been facing increasing political and governance pressures. Additionally, several prominent investors have opted to disregard their recommendations and establish their own review processes.</p>
<p>Our findings suggest a more nuanced picture than a simple story of proxy advisor decline. On one hand, it appears increasingly acceptable for companies to receive an ‘Against’ recommendation from ISS on share request proposals without risking a failed vote, a meaningful shift from prior seasons. On the other hand, granting one-time awards to Named Executive Officers (NEOs) remains a lightning-rod issue, drawing direct investor scrutiny that operates largely independent of proxy advisors. Where low Say on Pay results do occur, we continue to observe reduced vote support for compensation committee chairs, reinforcing that director accountability remains a live mechanism even as its use stays selective <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/13/the-2026-proxy-season-in-progress/#more-181852" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading The 2026 Proxy Season in Progress">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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