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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>ESG and Anti-ESG Shareholder Proposals in 2026 &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>ESG and Anti-ESG Shareholder Proposals in 2026</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/14/esg-and-anti-esg-shareholder-proposals-in-2026/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=esg-and-anti-esg-shareholder-proposals-in-2026</link>
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		<pubDate>Sun, 14 Jun 2026 11:30:17 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Anti-ESG Activism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Climate Risk Disclosure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Diversity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Equity & Inclusion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ESG Shareholder Proposals]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Proxy Season 2026]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[shareholder engagement]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[In many ways, the 2026 proxy season has been markedly different than prior seasons, due, in no small part, to the November 2025 decision by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) Staff not to provide substantive guidance on the grounds on which a company could omit a shareholder proposal under most prongs of Rule [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Jennifer Zepralka, Ali Perry, and Liz Walsh, Mayer Brown LLP, on Sunday, June 14, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/people/z/jennifer-zepralka">Jennifer Zepralka</a> is a Partner, and <a href="https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/people/p/perry-alexandra-ali">Ali Perry</a> and <a href="https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/people/w/liz-walsh">Liz Walsh</a> are Counsels at Mayer Brown LLP. This post was prepared for the Forum by Ms. Perry, Ms. Walsh, Ms. Zepralka, <a href="https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/people/k/milly-kim">Milly Kim</a>, and <a href="https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/people/p/pinedo-anna-t">Anna Pinedo</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p align="left">In many ways, the 2026 proxy season has been markedly different than prior seasons, due, in no small part, to the November 2025 decision by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) Staff not to provide substantive guidance on the grounds on which a company could omit a shareholder proposal under most prongs of Rule 14a-8 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”).  This change in the SEC’s approach created a new dynamic between companies and proponents, including with respect to the level of engagement between the parties and the factors a company must consider in determining whether to include a proposal in its proxy statement.  What is not different from the 2025 proxy season, though, is the prevalence of “anti-ESG” shareholder proposals submitted to public companies.  These proposals are generally critical of, or question the value of, company policies or initiatives related to environmental, social or governance (“ESG”) factors, including how the company discloses, reacts to and manages ESG-related risks and policies, such as, for example, risks related to carbon emissions, as well as policies addressing diversity, shareholder rights and corporate social responsibility.<a class="footnote" id="1b" href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/14/esg-and-anti-esg-shareholder-proposals-in-2026/#1">[1]</a>  As of the midpoint of the 2026 proxy season, “anti-ESG” proposals are very common, just as they have been in recent years.</p>
<p align="left"> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/14/esg-and-anti-esg-shareholder-proposals-in-2026/#more-181866" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading ESG and Anti-ESG Shareholder Proposals in 2026">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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