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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>When Stock Prices Become Targets: Earnings Management and Price Informativeness in China &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>When Stock Prices Become Targets: Earnings Management and Price Informativeness in China</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/16/when-stock-prices-become-targets-earnings-management-and-price-informativeness-in-china/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=when-stock-prices-become-targets-earnings-management-and-price-informativeness-in-china</link>
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		<pubDate>Tue, 16 Jun 2026 11:31:04 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Behavioral finance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Capital markets]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Earnings management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Emerging markets]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Financial reporting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Market efficiency]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[China’s stock market appears to predict future corporate earnings, but this predictability does not necessarily mean prices are a clean “crystal ball” for fundamentals. High valuations also appear to pressure firms to cater to investor expectations by inflating reported earnings, especially through non-recurring gains and losses. The result is a distinctive pattern: short-run earnings predictability [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Zhiguo He (Stanford University), Wenxi Jiang (Chinese University of Hong Kong), and Wei Xiong (Princeton University), on Tuesday, June 16, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/faculty/zhiguo-he">Zhiguo He</a> is the James Irvin Miller Professor of Finance at Stanford University; <a href="https://www.bschool.cuhk.edu.hk/staff/jiang-wenxi-griffin/">Wenxi Jiang</a> is a Professor of Finance at the Chinese University of Hong Kong Business School; and <a href="https://wxiong.mycpanel.princeton.edu/">Wei Xiong</a> is the John H. Scully &#8217;66 Professor in Finance and Professor of Economics at Princeton University.<span style="font-size: 10pt;"> This post is based on their recent </span><a style="font-size: 10pt;" href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5327469">paper</a><span style="font-size: 10pt;">.</span></p>
</div></hgroup><p>China’s stock market appears to predict future corporate earnings, but this predictability does not necessarily mean prices are a clean “crystal ball” for fundamentals. High valuations also appear to pressure firms to cater to investor expectations by inflating reported earnings, especially through non-recurring gains and losses. The result is a distinctive pattern: short-run earnings predictability followed by longer-run reversal, suggesting that price informativeness and earnings management can reinforce each other.</p>
<p>Can stock markets discipline firms and allocate capital efficiently when the accounting system is still developing? This question is central to current debates about China’s capital markets. Policymakers have sought to make the A-share market a more important venue for financing innovation, disciplining listed firms, and giving households a larger stake in corporate growth. At the same time, China’s equity market remains known for speculative trading, retail investor dominance, weak delisting discipline in earlier years, and recurring concerns about the quality of listed firms’ financial reports.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/16/when-stock-prices-become-targets-earnings-management-and-price-informativeness-in-china/#more-181915" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading When Stock Prices Become Targets: Earnings Management and Price Informativeness in China">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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