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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Explaining Delaware&#8217;s Dominance &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Explaining Delaware&#8217;s Dominance</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/24/explaining-delawares-dominance/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=explaining-delawares-dominance</link>
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		<pubDate>Wed, 24 Jun 2026 11:31:20 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Corporate Incorporation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Delaware Corporate Law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Institutional Ownership]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Legal Flexibility]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mergers & acquisitions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Takeover Activity]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[For most of the modern era, Delaware has been the default home of American corporate law. That dominance is familiar, but it is also puzzling. Delaware does not offer corporations a simple code of bright-line rules. It offers fiduciary standards, judicial review, and a continuing stream of case law. Other states have often promised more [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Ofer Eldar (UC Berkeley) and Lorenzo Magnolfi (OSU), on Wednesday, June 24, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://www.law.berkeley.edu/our-faculty/faculty-profiles/ofer-eldar/#tab_profile">Ofer Eldar</a> is a Professor of Law at UC Berkeley and <a href="https://www.lorenzomagnolfi.com/">Lorenzo Magnolfi</a> is an Associate Professor of Economics at Ohio State University. This post is based on their recent <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5507918">paper</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>For most of the modern era, Delaware has been the default home of American corporate law. That dominance is familiar, but it is also puzzling. Delaware does not offer corporations a simple code of bright-line rules. It offers fiduciary standards, judicial review, and a continuing stream of case law. Other states have often promised more predictable statutes that limit litigation and protect managerial discretion. Yet public companies continued to choose Delaware in large numbers.</p>
<p>The current debate over DExit makes this puzzle newly important. High-profile firms have explored or completed moves to states such as Nevada and Texas, often arguing that Delaware law has become too uncertain or too intrusive. To assess that critique, it helps to ask why firms chose Delaware in the first place.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/24/explaining-delawares-dominance/#more-182063" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Explaining Delaware&#8217;s Dominance">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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