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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Chancery Finds Potential Liability for Blocking Company Financings Despite Contractual Veto Rights &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Chancery Finds Potential Liability for Blocking Company Financings Despite Contractual Veto Rights</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/07/20/chancery-finds-potential-liability-for-blocking-company-financings-despite-contractual-veto-rights/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=chancery-finds-potential-liability-for-blocking-company-financings-despite-contractual-veto-rights</link>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2026 11:30:39 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=182371?d=20260720160707EDT</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[In Zync v. Porsche et al (May 29, 2026), the Delaware Court of Chancery, at the pleading stage of litigation, declined to dismiss claims against Porsche, a 5% stockholder in  Zync, Inc. (the “Company”), and Porsche’s designee on the Company’s board of directors (the “Porsche Director”), relating to their blocking the Company’s critically needed financings, [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Gail Weinstein, Philip Richter, and Steven Epstein, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP, on Monday, July 20, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://www.friedfrank.com/our-people/gail-weinstein" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Gail Weinstein</a> is a Senior Counsel, <a href="https://www.friedfrank.com/our-people/philip-richter" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Philip Richter</a> is a Partner and a Co-Head of the M&amp;A and Private Equity Practice, and <a href="https://www.friedfrank.com/our-people/steven-epstein" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Steven Epstein</a> is the Managing Partner at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver &amp; Jacobson LLP. This post is based on a Fried Frank memorandum by Ms. Weinstein, Mr. Richter, Mr. Epstein, <a href="https://www.friedfrank.com/our-people/steven-steinman" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Steven J. Steinman</a>, <a href="https://www.friedfrank.com/our-people/randi-lally" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Randi Lally</a>, and <a href="https://www.friedfrank.com/our-people/colum-weiden" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Colum J. Weiden</a>, and is part of the <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/category/delaware-law-series/">Delaware Law Series</a>; links to other posts in the series are available <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/category/delaware-law-series/">here</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>In <em>Zync v. Porsche et al</em> (May 29, 2026), the Delaware Court of Chancery, at the pleading stage of litigation, declined to dismiss claims against Porsche, a 5% stockholder in  Zync, Inc. (the “Company”), and Porsche’s designee on the Company’s board of directors (the “Porsche Director”), relating to their blocking the Company’s critically needed financings, although Porsche had a contractual veto right over the financings. Allegedly, Porsche’s Director, whose approval was required for the financings, refused to act without Porsche’s prior approval; Porsche delayed providing, or refused to provide, approval for the financings; and, as a result, the Company was unable to secure funding and had to shut down.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/07/20/chancery-finds-potential-liability-for-blocking-company-financings-despite-contractual-veto-rights/#more-182371" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Chancery Finds Potential Liability for Blocking Company Financings Despite Contractual Veto Rights">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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