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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Governance Proposals Dominate the 2026 Proxy Season &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Governance Proposals Dominate the 2026 Proxy Season</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/07/21/governance-proposals-dominate-the-2026-proxy-season/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=governance-proposals-dominate-the-2026-proxy-season</link>
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		<pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 11:32:46 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Governance proposals]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Independent board chair]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Proxy Season 2026]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Proxy voting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder proposals]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder rights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Special meeting rights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Supermajority voting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Written consent]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[As the 2026 U.S. proxy season draws to a close, both the volume of shareholder proposals brought to a vote and the level of investor support they received show a dramatic change from previous years in the shareholder proposal landscape. Early in 2025, the SEC issued Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14M (SLB 14M), revising shareholder [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Subodh Mishra, ISS STOXX, on Tuesday, July 21, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;">Subodh Mishra is the Global Head of Communications at ISS STOXX. This post is based on an ISS-Corporate memorandum by Henry Mbom, Vice President, Compensation and Governance Advisory; and Toby Huang, Senior Associate, Data Analytics, at ISS-Corporate.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>As the 2026 U.S. proxy season draws to a close, both the volume of shareholder proposals brought to a vote and the level of investor support they received show a dramatic change from previous years in the shareholder proposal landscape.</p>
<p>Early in 2025, the SEC issued <a href="https://www.sec.gov/about/shareholder-proposals-staff-legal-bulletin-no-14m-cf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14M (SLB 14M)</a>, revising shareholder proposal framework and providing issuers greater flexibility to obtain no-action relief. This change had <a href="https://www.iss-corporate.com/resources/reports/2025-us-governance-post-season-review-evolving-priorities-in-a-shifting-landscape/">a significant impact during the 2025 proxy</a> season, greatly increasing the number of proposals being omitted from the ballot. The shareholder proposal landscape was further upended ahead of the 2026 proxy season, with the SEC’s Division of Corporate Finance retreating from its traditional role as an arbitrator of shareholder proposals, <a href="https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/statement-regarding-division-corporation-finances-role-exchange-act-rule-14a-8-process-current-proxy-season" target="_blank" rel="noopener">declining to review or express views</a> on most requests for shareholder proposal exclusions.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/07/21/governance-proposals-dominate-the-2026-proxy-season/#more-182710" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Governance Proposals Dominate the 2026 Proxy Season">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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