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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Delaware Chancery Clarifies Implied Covenant Limits &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Delaware Chancery Clarifies Implied Covenant Limits</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/07/25/delaware-chancery-clarifies-implied-covenant-limits/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=delaware-chancery-clarifies-implied-covenant-limits</link>
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		<pubDate>Sat, 25 Jul 2026 11:30:11 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Delaware Law Series]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[breach of contract]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[commercial contracts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[contract interpretation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Contract Law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[contractual gap-filling]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[delaware]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Delaware law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Delaware litigation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[third-party consent]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Key Points The decision clarifies that a party’s using a contractual gap to “intentionally harm” the counterparty may constitute a breach of the implied covenant. The court rejected ASM’s argument that the parties had intentionally left a contractual gap with respect to the efforts ASM had to use to obtain the consents, in order to allocate [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Gail Weinstein, Philip Richter, and Steven Epstein, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP, on Saturday, July 25, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://www.friedfrank.com/our-people/gail-weinstein" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Gail Weinstein</a> is a Senior Counsel, <a href="https://www.friedfrank.com/our-people/philip-richter" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Philip Richter</a> is a Partner and Co-Head of the M&amp;A and Private Equity Practice, and <a href="https://www.friedfrank.com/our-people/steven-epstein" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Steven Epstein</a> is the Managing Partner at Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver &amp; Jacobson LLP. This post is based on a Fried Frank memorandum by Ms. Weinstein, Mr. Richter, Mr. Epstein, <a href="https://www.friedfrank.com/our-people/roy-tannenbaum" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.friedfrank.com/our-people/roy-tannenbaum&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1784403804569000&amp;usg=AOvVaw3-npmZjg_1Qh4A3uz6m4Tx">Roy Tannenbaum</a>, <a href="https://www.friedfrank.com/our-people/adam-b-cohen" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.friedfrank.com/our-people/adam-b-cohen&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1784403804569000&amp;usg=AOvVaw1KntWzV3KHO1uFyIOIQTnG">Adam Cohen</a>, and <a href="https://www.friedfrank.com/our-people/liza-andrews" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?q=https://www.friedfrank.com/our-people/liza-andrews&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1784403804569000&amp;usg=AOvVaw3yzFHCCDpw3bEhsfim9X7v">Liza Andrews</a>, and is part of the <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/category/delaware-law-series/">Delaware Law Series</a>; links to other posts in the series are available <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/category/delaware-law-series/">here</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><h2>Key Points</h2>
<ul>
<li><strong>The decision clarifies that a party’s using a contractual gap to “intentionally harm” the counterparty may constitute a breach of the implied covenant. </strong>The court rejected ASM’s argument that the parties had intentionally left a contractual gap with respect to the efforts ASM had to use to obtain the consents, in order to allocate the risk to the Vendor of the landlords not giving the consent for any reason. The court stated that, at the pleading stage, it was reasonably conceivable that, without a standard of efforts set forth in the agreement, ASM could have been neutral with the landlords, but, based on the implied covenant, could not use the contractual gap to “intentionally harm” the Vendor.</li>
<li><strong>The decision underscores the need for careful drafting of third party consent conditions. </strong>Parties should consider whether to specify in their agreement a standard of efforts for obtaining such consents and may wish to specify the extent to which the other party can participate in the process of seeking to obtain them. Where a standard of efforts is not set forth, the party responsible for seeking a consent should keep in mind that, depending on the specific facts and circumstances, advocating for the third party not to give the consent may be considered to be intentionally harming the counterparty and thus a breach of the implied covenant.</li>
</ul>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/07/25/delaware-chancery-clarifies-implied-covenant-limits/#more-182688" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Delaware Chancery Clarifies Implied Covenant Limits">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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