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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>The Sound of Silence &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>The Sound of Silence</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/08/13/the-sound-of-silence/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=the-sound-of-silence</link>
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		<pubDate>Thu, 13 Aug 2026 11:30:29 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Delaware Law Series]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Contract Drafting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Deal Practice]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[delaware]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Delaware law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Judicial Signaling]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[M&A]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sandbagging]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[In 2018, the Delaware Supreme Court dropped a footnote. In Eagle Force Holdings v. Campbell, Justice Valihura noted that the court had never actually decided whether a buyer who knows that some of the seller&#8217;s representations are false can still sue for breach after closing — the practice deal lawyers call “sandbagging.” Then-Chief Justice Strine, [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Mitu Gulati (University of Virginia), Stephen Choi (NYU), and Molly Ball (University of Virginia), on Thursday, August 13, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://www.law.virginia.edu/faculty/profile/gmg4n/1169041">Mitu Gulati</a> is the Warner-Booker Distinguished Professor of International Law at the University of Virginia School of Law, <a href="https://its.law.nyu.edu/facultyprofiles/index.cfm?fuseaction=profile.overview&amp;personid=23843">Stephen J. Choi</a> is the Bernard Petrie Professor of Law and Business and Director of the Pollack Center at the New York University School of Law, and Molly Ball is a J.D. candidate at the University of Virginia School of Law. This post is based on their recent <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=7191518">article</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>In 2018, the Delaware Supreme Court dropped a footnote. In <em>Eagle Force Holdings v. Campbell</em>, Justice Valihura noted that the court had never actually decided whether a buyer who knows that some of the seller&#8217;s representations are false can still sue for breach after closing — the practice deal lawyers call “sandbagging.” Then-Chief Justice Strine, dissenting in part, confirmed, in his part of opinion, that Delaware had not yet decided the question.</p>
<p>Many M&amp;A practitioners took the footnotes in <em>Eagle Force</em> as a signal that Delaware law was undecided on sandbagging. Because buyers rely on “pro-sandbagging” rules to protect their bargained-for representations and prevent sellers from opportunistically using the buyer&#8217;s due diligence as a shield against liability, the sudden ambiguity caused consternation among practitioners. Practitioners debated whether the signal from footnotes in Eagle Force meant that buyers needed to put in explicit pro sandbagging clauses in M&amp;A contracts. Memos on this theme poured out, including from several prominent law firms including Ballard Spahr, Goodwin Procter, Mayer Brown, Paul Weiss, and Kramer Levin. The ABA ran CLE programming on it. A slide deck from a marquee panel of M&amp;A lawyers at Northwestern&#8217;s Securities Regulation Institute put it bluntly: don&#8217;t assume silence is safe anymore — put an express pro-sandbagging clause in the contract.</p>
<p>The advice was nearly unanimous. And the market ignored it.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/08/13/the-sound-of-silence/#more-183229" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading The Sound of Silence">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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