The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu The leading online blog in the fields of corporate governance and financial regulation. Sat, 15 Aug 2026 11:30:57 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.5.10 https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/cropped-photography-4-e1706898544564-1-32x32.png Debunking Five Investor Relations Fallacies for Controlled Companies – The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu 32 32 Debunking Five Investor Relations Fallacies for Controlled Companies https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/08/15/debunking-five-investor-relations-fallacies-for-controlled-companies/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=debunking-five-investor-relations-fallacies-for-controlled-companies https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/08/15/debunking-five-investor-relations-fallacies-for-controlled-companies/#respond Sat, 15 Aug 2026 11:30:57 +0000 https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=183183?d=20260814143859EDT Posted by Garrett Muzikowski, Christina Dell'Orto, and Caleigh Leyton, FTI Consulting, on Saturday, August 15, 2026
Editor's Note:

Garrett Muzikowski is a Managing Director, Christina Dell’Orto is a Senior Director, and Caleigh Leyton is a Senior Consultant at FTI Consulting. This post is based on an FTI Consulting memorandum by Mr. Muzikowski, Ms. Dell’Orto, Ms. Leyton, and Patrick C. Tucker, all at FTI Consulting.

SpaceX, one of the largest companies in the world, just went public, and its founder, Elon Musk, holds 82.4% of the company’s voting power.[1]

Theoretically, controlled companies are supposed to be insulated from shareholder pressure. Even “effectively controlled” companies – those with a large investor (for example, a 20% holder) – should benefit from this protection. Conceptually, a controlling shareholder, whether through economic ownership or through multi-class share structures, should remove the threat of proxy contests, hostile takeovers or other challenges to board decisions. The textbook activist mechanisms that are supposed to hold management and a company’s board accountable to shareholders do not apply to these companies.

Why, then, are controlled companies among the hottest new targets for shareholder activism and under pressure from the capital markets to pursue or stop pursuing merger and acquisition (“M&A”) decisions?

(more…)

]]> https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/08/15/debunking-five-investor-relations-fallacies-for-controlled-companies/feed/ 0