<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/"
	>

<channel>
	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
	<atom:link href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/09/14/dats-and-crypto-pivot-companies-understanding-and-mitigating-shareholder-activism-risks/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu</link>
	<description>The leading online blog in the fields of corporate governance and financial regulation.</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Mon, 14 Sep 2026 11:32:12 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<language>en-US</language>
	<sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>https://wordpress.org/?v=6.5.10</generator>

 
	<item>
		<title>DATs and Crypto-Pivot Companies: Understanding and Mitigating Shareholder Activism Risks</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/09/14/dats-and-crypto-pivot-companies-understanding-and-mitigating-shareholder-activism-risks/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=dats-and-crypto-pivot-companies-understanding-and-mitigating-shareholder-activism-risks</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/09/14/dats-and-crypto-pivot-companies-understanding-and-mitigating-shareholder-activism-risks/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 14 Sep 2026 11:30:13 +0000</pubDate>
<!-- 		<dc:creator><![CDATA[]]></dc:creator> -->
				<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Crypto]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[DATs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NAV]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder activism]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=183802?d=20260911144412EDT</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The emergence of digital asset treasury companies (&#8220;DATs&#8221;) and crypto-pivot companies &#8211; public companies that have repositioned all or a substantial portion of their corporate strategy around the acquisition, accumulation, and management of digital assets &#8211; has introduced a new and rapidly evolving sector of public companies to the market. Since the beginning of 2025, [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Leonard Wood, Daniel Roeser, and Karen Ubell, Goodwin Procter LLP, on Monday, September 14, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://www.goodwinlaw.com/en/people/w/wood-leonard" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?hl=en&amp;q=https://www.goodwinlaw.com/en/people/w/wood-leonard&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1789052557013000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0lwyFoUt4sDjTQIZz2JQR0">Leonard Wood</a> is Chair of the Shareholder Activism and Takeover Defense Practice, <a href="https://www.goodwinlaw.com/en/people/r/roeser-daniel" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?hl=en&amp;q=https://www.goodwinlaw.com/en/people/r/roeser-daniel&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1789052557013000&amp;usg=AOvVaw0KcgtPRXLbOFQs4kuiiMzh">Daniel Roeser</a> is a Partner in the <a href="https://www.goodwinlaw.com/en/expertise/practices/securities-litigation-and-sec-enforcement" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?hl=en&amp;q=https://www.goodwinlaw.com/en/expertise/practices/securities-litigation-and-sec-enforcement&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1789052557013000&amp;usg=AOvVaw2gfF5TR3TG7gf30t3E_mPt">Securities Litigation</a> and <a href="https://www.goodwinlaw.com/en/expertise/practices/enforcement-and-government-investigations" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?hl=en&amp;q=https://www.goodwinlaw.com/en/expertise/practices/enforcement-and-government-investigations&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1789052557013000&amp;usg=AOvVaw34fRAReAxRJIcEfEKnNWzE">White Collar Defense</a> groups, and <a href="https://www.goodwinlaw.com/en/people/u/ubell-karen" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?hl=en&amp;q=https://www.goodwinlaw.com/en/people/u/ubell-karen&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1789052557013000&amp;usg=AOvVaw3VMJpT3j4a2L_FCFqKRDg1">Karen Ubell</a> is Co-Chair, Digital Currency &amp; Blockchain at Goodwin Procter LLP. This post is based on their Goodwin memorandum.</p>
</div></hgroup><p id="p-rc_c3ddd3d81745c5bf-472" data-path-to-node="8">The emergence of digital asset treasury companies (&#8220;DATs&#8221;) and crypto-pivot companies &#8211; public companies that have repositioned all or a substantial portion of their corporate strategy around the acquisition, accumulation, and management of digital assets &#8211; has introduced a new and rapidly evolving sector of public companies to the market. Since the beginning of 2025, a growing number of public companies have adopted some version of the playbook: reposition legacy businesses around digital asset treasury strategies; accumulate digital assets on the balance sheet; and, in some cases, deploy digital assets to generate returns through staking,<a class="footnote" id="1b" href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/09/14/dats-and-crypto-pivot-companies-understanding-and-mitigating-shareholder-activism-risks/#1">[1]</a>  lending, protocol participation, and related activities. Early DATs and crypto-pivot companies attracted substantial institutional and retail capital because their stocks traded at a significant premium to the market values of their accumulated digital assets (i.e., their net asset value or &#8220;NAV&#8221;).</p>
<p data-path-to-node="8"> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/09/14/dats-and-crypto-pivot-companies-understanding-and-mitigating-shareholder-activism-risks/#more-183802" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading DATs and Crypto-Pivot Companies: Understanding and Mitigating Shareholder Activism Risks">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
			<wfw:commentRss>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/09/14/dats-and-crypto-pivot-companies-understanding-and-mitigating-shareholder-activism-risks/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
		<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		</item>
	</channel>
</rss>
