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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Shareholder Activism: Ten Trends for 2027 &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Shareholder Activism: Ten Trends for 2027</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/09/15/shareholder-activism-ten-trends-for-2027/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=shareholder-activism-ten-trends-for-2027</link>
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		<pubDate>Tue, 15 Sep 2026 11:32:29 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI-driven proxy voting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Proxy season]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Proxy voting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder activism]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Last year, we identified ten trends that we expected to shape shareholder activism in 2026. Those trends included: increasing M&#38;A-focused activism, emboldened occasional activists, less visibility into shareholder views, the normalization of serving as a dissident nominee, and more “withhold” campaigns. The 2026 proxy season has largely borne out our expectations. Activism continued at elevated [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Elina Tetelbaum and Loren Braswell, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, on Tuesday, September 15, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://www.wlrk.com/attorney/etetelbaum/" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Elina Tetelbaum</a> is a Partner and <a href="https://www.wlrk.com/attorney/lbraswell/" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Loren Braswell</a> is Counsel at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen &amp; Katz. This post is based on their Wachtell Lipton memorandum.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>Last year, we identified <a href="https://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/ClientMemos/WLRK/WLRK.29850.25.pdf">ten trends</a> that we expected to shape shareholder activism in 2026. Those trends included: increasing M&amp;A-focused activism, emboldened occasional activists, less visibility into shareholder views, the normalization of serving as a dissident nominee, and more “withhold” campaigns.</p>
<p>The 2026 proxy season has largely borne out our expectations. Activism continued at elevated levels globally in the first half of 2026. Approximately 40% of campaigns involved an M&amp;A-related thesis, fueled by a constructive regulatory and financial environment. However, the high volume of activism has not translated into a corresponding increase in proxy fights going to a vote. Settlements remain the principal mechanism for resolution, with a significant number of settlements being announced prior to any public agitation by the activist. The proxy voting system is also becoming more fragmented, and therefore less predictable, as the “Big Three” institutional investors split their voting teams, pass-through voting becomes more prevalent, and large investors increasingly incorporate AI into their voting models.</p>
<p>Against this backdrop, we expect the following ten trends for the year ahead.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/09/15/shareholder-activism-ten-trends-for-2027/#more-183862" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Shareholder Activism: Ten Trends for 2027">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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