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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>2026 Say on Pay Recap: Strong Results and Evolving ﻿Voting Dynamics &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>2026 Say on Pay Recap: Strong Results and Evolving ﻿Voting Dynamics</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/09/26/2026-say-on-pay-recap-strong-results-and-evolving-voting-dynamics/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=2026-say-on-pay-recap-strong-results-and-evolving-voting-dynamics</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/09/26/2026-say-on-pay-recap-strong-results-and-evolving-voting-dynamics/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 26 Sep 2026 11:30:06 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Proxy Advisor]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[S&P 500]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Say on pay]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[TSR]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[KEY TAKEAWAYS 2026 is shaping up to be the strongest Say-on-Pay (SOP) season in recent history. Average S&#38;P 500 SOP support reached 90.3%, the only time above 90% in the past 5 years. Low support is less prevalent. Only 5% of companies received less than 70% support in 2026, down from 11% in 2022. Strong [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Emily Chase, Perla Cuevas, and Linda Pappas, Pay Governance LLC, on Saturday, September 26, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;">Emily Chase and Perla Cuevas are Consultants and <a href="https://www.paygovernance.com/people/linda-pappas" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Linda Pappas</a> is a Principal at Pay Governance LLC. This post is based on their Pay Governance memorandum.</p>
</div></hgroup><h2>KEY TAKEAWAYS</h2>
<ul>
<li>2026 is shaping up to be the strongest Say-on-Pay (SOP) season in recent history. Average S&amp;P 500 SOP support reached 90.3%, the only time above 90% in the past 5 years.</li>
<li>Low support is less prevalent. Only 5% of companies received less than 70% support in 2026, down from 11% in 2022.</li>
<li>Strong S&amp;P 500 total shareholder return (TSR) coincided with favorable SOP results. Since 2024, SOP failures have remained at 1% of S&amp;P 500 proposals while one-, three-, and five-year TSR results were strongly positive.</li>
<li>Influence of proxy advisor SOP opposition continues to deteriorate. Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) opposition declined to 9% year-over-year, while Glass Lewis (GL) opposition increased slightly to 13%. When both proxy advisors opposed SOP this season, only 19% failed to receive majority shareholder support, down from 50% in 2022.</li>
<li>The “big five” investors continue to take a selective approach to opposing S&amp;P 500 SOP proposals and rely heavily on their proprietary voting frameworks. Top asset managers supported SOP at a rate of 95.6% in 2026 and deviated from proxy advisor SOP opposition in an overwhelming majority of cases.</li>
<li>As the proxy voting landscape continues to evolve, understanding investor expectations and effectively communicating rationale for compensation decisions is critical to strengthening SOP support.</li>
</ul>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/09/26/2026-say-on-pay-recap-strong-results-and-evolving-voting-dynamics/#more-183959" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading 2026 Say on Pay Recap: Strong Results and Evolving ﻿Voting Dynamics">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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