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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Exit After Exit: Venture Capital Involvement Post-IPO &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Exit After Exit: Venture Capital Involvement Post-IPO</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/10/05/exit-after-exit-venture-capital-involvement-post-ipo/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=exit-after-exit-venture-capital-involvement-post-ipo</link>
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		<pubDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 11:31:41 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Corporate governance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Dual-Class Shares]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IPO]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder activism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Venture Capital]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=184076?d=20261005093543EDT</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The IPO is commonly understood as the end of venture capital’s (VC) role in corporate governance. As the conventional story goes, after a relatively short post-IPO lock-up, VCs sell their shares and give way to public-market institutions. Ownership disperses, the balance of control shifts, and the company enters a new phase of its life governed [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Yifat Aran (University of Haifa), Brian Broughman (Vanderbilt University Law School), and Elizabeth Pollman (University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School), on Monday, October 5, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://www.yifataran.com/">Yifat Aran</a> is Assistant Professor of Business Law at the University of Haifa Faculty of Law, <a href="https://law.vanderbilt.edu/bio/brian-broughman/">Brian Broughman</a> is Professor of Law at Vanderbilt University Law School, and <a href="https://www.law.upenn.edu/faculty/epollman">Elizabeth Pollman</a> is the Perry Golkin Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School. This post is based on their <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=7499098#">article</a>, Exit After Exit, forthcoming in the <em>Harvard Business Law Review</em>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>The IPO is commonly understood as the end of venture capital’s (VC) role in corporate governance. As the conventional story goes, after a relatively short post-IPO lock-up, VCs sell their shares and give way to public-market institutions. Ownership disperses, the balance of control shifts, and the company enters a new phase of its life governed by public-market discipline. In our article, we show that this paradigm is inaccurate: VCs often remain important shareholders and governance participants for years after the IPO.</p>
<p><strong>Descriptive Statistics and Findings</strong></p>
<p>Drawing on a dataset of 844 U.S. venture-backed companies that completed IPOs between 2002 and 2020, we find sustained VC ownership and influence well beyond the lock-up period. A full financial exit by VCs often takes years rather than months. VCs retain an aggregate equity stake above 5% in the median dual-class firm for three years after the IPO and in the median single-class firm for four years. Even by year seven, roughly a quarter of single-class firms and 14% of dual-class firms still have aggregate VC ownership above that threshold.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/10/05/exit-after-exit-venture-capital-involvement-post-ipo/#more-184076" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Exit After Exit: Venture Capital Involvement Post-IPO">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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