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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<title>Mandatory Arbitration and State Competition for Corporate Charters &#8211; The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Mandatory Arbitration and State Competition for Corporate Charters</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/10/15/mandatory-arbitration-and-state-competition-for-corporate-charters/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=mandatory-arbitration-and-state-competition-for-corporate-charters</link>
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		<pubDate>Thu, 15 Oct 2026 11:31:15 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Corporate governance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[corporate law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[delaware]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Dual-Class Shares]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[political economy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Regulatory]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Mandatory arbitration of shareholder claims is on the horizon. SEC Chair Paul Atkins has led the SEC to change its long-standing policy against mandatory arbitration. Space Exploration Technologies Corp. (“Space X”), a Texas corporation, recently went public with bylaws that conditionally provide for mandatory arbitration of a broad set of shareholder claims. Silicon Valley companies [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Marcel Kahan (NYU) and Edward B. Rock (NYU), on Thursday, October 15, 2026 </em><div class='e_n' style='background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px;text-indent:2.5em;'><strong style='margin-left:-2.5em;'>Editor's Note: </strong> <p style="margin:0; display:inline;"><a href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__its.law.nyu.edu_facultyprofiles_index.cfm-3Ffuseaction-3Dprofile.overview-26personid-3D20029&amp;d=DwMFaQ&amp;c=WO-RGvefibhHBZq3fL85hQ&amp;r=N6qStalIOJ_SM6O3qY6JesfyaKunQab_Y5hEAg0TgZ0&amp;m=n6dbE_9pz1Syz0dUV4EQf0eQmye4eS0bf7ZS1CNnJ5uoLbZ9glSvsZOUMn2dtnTR&amp;s=zhBlr3n0CrS3X4nIMr4L-SSlEOlhRJz7jwZtBKH5ReM&amp;e=">Marcel Kahan</a> is the George T. Lowy Professor of Law, and <a href="https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__its.law.nyu.edu_facultyprofiles_index.cfm-3Ffuseaction-3Dprofile.overview-26personid-3D35610&amp;d=DwMFaQ&amp;c=WO-RGvefibhHBZq3fL85hQ&amp;r=N6qStalIOJ_SM6O3qY6JesfyaKunQab_Y5hEAg0TgZ0&amp;m=n6dbE_9pz1Syz0dUV4EQf0eQmye4eS0bf7ZS1CNnJ5uoLbZ9glSvsZOUMn2dtnTR&amp;s=23E9abe0xJi12GDVai1kbhKioh2UpUMwlqsXDzwLX4k&amp;e=">Edward B. Rock</a> is the Martin Lipton Professor of Law at New York University School of Law. This post is based on their recent <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=7485361">paper</a> and is part of the <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/the-delaware-law-series/">Delaware Law Series</a>; links to other posts in the series are available <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/the-delaware-law-series/">here</a>.</p>
</div></hgroup><p>Mandatory arbitration of shareholder claims is on the horizon. SEC Chair Paul Atkins has led the SEC to change its long-standing policy against mandatory arbitration. Space Exploration Technologies Corp. (“Space X”), a Texas corporation, recently went public with bylaws that conditionally provide for mandatory arbitration of a broad set of shareholder claims. Silicon Valley companies and their lawyers have long sought the ability to mandate arbitration and have been emboldened by their recent success in pressuring Delaware to change its law. We expect that there will be a renewed push to amend the Delaware General Corporation Law and the laws of other states to permit mandatory arbitration of shareholder claims. What are the present opportunities for companies to subject shareholder claims to mandatory arbitration? How will mandatory arbitration affect state competition for corporate charters? How should Delaware respond?</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/10/15/mandatory-arbitration-and-state-competition-for-corporate-charters/#more-184347" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Mandatory Arbitration and State Competition for Corporate Charters">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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