Posts from: Andrew Baker


How Much Do We Trust Staggered Difference-in-Differences Estimates?

David F. Larcker is the James Irvin Miller Professor of Accounting at Stanford Graduate School of Business; Charles C.Y. Wang is the Glenn and Mary Jane Creamer Associate Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School; and Andrew Baker is a J.D. candidate at Stanford Law School. This post is based on their recent paper. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes Short-Termism and Capital Flows by Jesse Fried and Charles C. Y. Wang (discussed on the Forum here).

Difference-in-differences (DiD) has been the workhorse statistical methodology for analyzing regulatory or policy effects in applied finance, law, and accounting research. A generalized version of this estimation approach that relies on the staggered adoption of regulations or policies (e.g., across states or across countries) has become especially popular over the last two decades. For example, from 2000 to 2019, there were 751 papers published in (or accepted for publication by) top tier finance or accounting journals that use DiD designs. Among them, 366 (or 49%) employ a staggered DiD design. Many of the staggered DiD papers address significant questions in corporate governance and financial regulation.

The prevalent use of staggered DiD reflects a common belief among researchers that such designs are more robust and mitigate concerns that contemporaneous trends could confound the treatment effect of interest. However, recent advances in econometric theory suggest that staggered DiD designs often do not provide valid estimates of average treatment effects.

In a paper recently posted on SSRN, we find that staggered DiD designs often can, and have, resulted in misleading inferences in the literature. We also show that applying robust DiD alternatives can significantly alter inferences in important papers in corporate governance and financial regulation.

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Environmental Spinoffs: The Attempt to Dump Liability Through Spin and Bankruptcy

David F. Larcker is the James Irvin Miller Professor of Accounting at Stanford Graduate School of Business; Brian Tayan is a Researcher with the Corporate Governance Research Initiative at Stanford Graduate School of Business; and Andrew C. Baker is a student at Stanford University School of Law. This post is based on their recent paper.

We recently published a paper, Environmental Spinoffs: The Attempt to Dump Liability Through Spin and Bankruptcy, that examines the practice of companies spinning off their environmental liabilities into separate companies that prove to be inadequately capitalized to meet their obligations.

A core tenant of economics is that the creation of shareholder and stakeholder value requires a complete and accurate accounting of the costs and benefits of business decisions. If costs are ignored or excluded, corporate decisions are distorted, leading to investment that might not otherwise be approved or would be priced differently. The omitted costs, however, do not disappear. They shift to parties not represented in the transaction—and are typically borne by society and redressed through taxation, lawsuits, or regulation. This problem is known as the externality problem.

Examples of externalities are plentiful. In the financial crisis, the risk of inadequately structured mortgage loans and securitizations ultimately fell on U.S. taxpayers. The aggressive marketing and prescription of opioid painkillers has led to the addiction and death of thousands of Americans. Oil and gas extraction through hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) has in some cases led to water and land contamination. And for many decades—leading up to and including today—industrial production has created byproducts that compromise land, water, or air quality, and require costly remediation. In all of these cases, society is the residual claimant, bearing the cost of outcomes that might never have occurred if they were properly included in the original business decision.

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Dual-Class Index Exclusion

Andrew Winden is a Fellow at the Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University and Andrew C. Baker is a Doctoral candidate in Accounting at the Stanford Graduate School of Business. This post is based on their recent paper. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock (discussed on the Forum here), and The Perils of Small-Minority Controllers (discussed on the Forum here), both by Lucian Bebchuk and Kobi Kastiel.

One of the most contentious and long-standing debates in corporate governance is whether company founders and other insiders should be permitted to use multi-class stock structures with unequal votes to control their companies while seeking capital through a public listing. Institutional investors have lobbied Congress, state legislatures and the Securities Exchange Commission unsuccessfully for decades to prohibit such stock structures. Following competitive pressure from the American Stock Exchange and NASDAQ, the New York Stock Exchange changed its listing rules to permit such structures in 1984. In the increasingly competitive global environment for listings, other stock exchanges have also started permitting multi-class listings.

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