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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>US Basel III Supplementary Leverage Ratio</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/10/05/us-basel-iii-supplementary-leverage-ratio/</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/10/05/us-basel-iii-supplementary-leverage-ratio/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Sun, 05 Oct 2014 13:00:08 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/?p=65961?d=20141215141517EST</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The U.S. banking agencies have finalized revisions to the denominator of the supplementary leverage ratio (SLR), which include a number of key changes and clarifications to their April 2014 proposal. The SLR represents the U.S. implementation of the Basel III leverage ratio. Under the U.S. banking agencies’ SLR framework, advanced approaches firms must maintain a [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Kobi Kastiel, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Sunday, October 5, 2014 </em><div style="background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px"><strong>Editor's Note: </strong> The following post comes to us from <a href="http://www.davispolk.com/lawyers/luigi-deghenghi/" target="_blank">Luigi L. De Ghenghi</a> and <a href="http://www.davispolk.com/lawyers/andrew-fei/" target="_blank">Andrew S. Fei</a>, attorneys in the Financial Institutions Group at Davis Polk &amp; Wardwell LLP, and is based on a Davis Polk client memorandum; the full publication, including diagrams, tables, and flowcharts, is available <a href="http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/09.12.14.Supplementary_Leverage_Ratio.pdf" target="_blank">here</a>.
</div></hgroup><p>The U.S. banking agencies have finalized revisions to the denominator of the supplementary leverage ratio (SLR), which include a number of key changes and clarifications to their April 2014 proposal. The SLR represents the U.S. implementation of the Basel III leverage ratio.</p>
<p>Under the U.S. banking agencies’ SLR framework, advanced approaches firms must maintain a minimum SLR of 3%, while the 8 U.S. bank holding companies that have been identified as global systemically important banks (U.S. G-SIBs) and their U.S. insured depository institution subsidiaries are subject to enhanced SLR standards (eSLR).</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/10/05/us-basel-iii-supplementary-leverage-ratio/#more-66076" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading US Basel III Supplementary Leverage Ratio">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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		<title>Proposed Dodd-Frank Concentration Limit on Financial Institution M&#038;A Transactions</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/06/11/proposed-dodd-frank-concentration-limit-on-financial-institution-ma-transactions/</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/06/11/proposed-dodd-frank-concentration-limit-on-financial-institution-ma-transactions/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 11 Jun 2014 13:00:20 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/?p=63832?d=20141215153926EST</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[In May 2014, the Federal Reserve issued a proposal that would implement the financial sector concentration limit set forth in Section 622 of the Dodd-Frank Act. The proposal reflects the Financial Stability Oversight Council’s January 2011 Study and Recommendations Regarding Concentration Limits on Large Financial Companies. The concentration limit generally prohibits a financial company from [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Kobi Kastiel, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Wednesday, June 11, 2014 </em><div style="background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px"><strong>Editor's Note: </strong> The following post is based on a Davis Polk publication by <a href="http://www.davispolk.com/lawyers/luigi-deghenghi/" target="_blank">Luigi L. De Ghenghi</a>, <a href="http://www.davispolk.com/lawyers/randall-guynn/" target="_blank">Randall Guynn</a>, <a href="http://www.davispolk.com/lawyers/margaret-tahyar/" target="_blank">Margaret E. Tahyar</a> and <a href="http://www.davispolk.com/lawyers/andrew-fei/" target="_blank">Andrew S. Fei</a>; the full publication, including visuals, tables and flowcharts, is available <a href="http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/05.27.14.Dodd-Frank.Concentration.Limit_.on_.Financial.Institution.MA_.pdf" target="_blank">here</a>.
</div></hgroup><p>In May 2014, the Federal Reserve issued a proposal that would implement the financial sector concentration limit set forth in Section 622 of the Dodd-Frank Act. The proposal reflects the Financial Stability Oversight Council’s January 2011 <em>Study and Recommendations Regarding Concentration Limits on Large Financial Companies</em>.</p>
<p>The concentration limit generally prohibits a financial company from merging or consolidating with, acquiring all or substantially all of the assets of, or otherwise acquiring control of another company if the “liabilities” of the resulting financial company, calculated using methodologies in the proposal, exceed 10% of aggregate financial sector liabilities.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/06/11/proposed-dodd-frank-concentration-limit-on-financial-institution-ma-transactions/#more-63832" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Proposed Dodd-Frank Concentration Limit on Financial Institution M&#038;A Transactions">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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		<title>US G-SIB Leverage Surcharge and Basel III Leverage Ratio</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/04/28/us-g-sib-leverage-surcharge-and-basel-iii-leverage-ratio/</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/04/28/us-g-sib-leverage-surcharge-and-basel-iii-leverage-ratio/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 28 Apr 2014 13:25:19 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/?p=62653?d=20141215162643EST</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The U.S. banking agencies have finalized higher leverage capital standards for the eight U.S. bank holding companies that have been identified as global systemically important banks (“U.S. G-SIBs”) and their insured depository institution (“IDI”) subsidiaries. The agencies also proposed important changes to the denominator of the U.S. Basel III supplementary leverage ratio (“SLR”). A number [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Kobi Kastiel, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Monday, April 28, 2014 </em><div style="background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px"><strong>Editor's Note: </strong> The following post comes to us from <a href="http://www.davispolk.com/lawyers/luigi-deghenghi/" target="_blank">Luigi L. De Ghenghi</a> and <a href="http://www.davispolk.com/lawyers/andrew-fei/" target="_blank">Andrew S. Fei</a>, attorneys in the Financial Institutions Group at Davis Polk &amp; Wardwell LLP, and is based on a Davis Polk client memorandum; the full publication, including visuals, tables, and flowcharts, is available <a href="http://blog.usbasel3.com/slr-basel3-leverage-comparison/" target="_blank">here</a>.
</div></hgroup><p>The U.S. banking agencies have finalized higher leverage capital standards for the eight U.S. bank holding companies that have been identified as global systemically important banks (“U.S. G-SIBs”) and their insured depository institution (“IDI”) subsidiaries. The agencies also proposed important changes to the denominator of the U.S. Basel III supplementary leverage ratio (“SLR”). A number of these proposed changes are intended to implement the Basel Committee’s January 2014 revisions to the Basel III leverage ratio.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/04/28/us-g-sib-leverage-surcharge-and-basel-iii-leverage-ratio/#more-62653" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading US G-SIB Leverage Surcharge and Basel III Leverage Ratio">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>US Intermediate Holding Company: Structuring and Regulatory Considerations for Foreign Banks</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/04/14/us-intermediate-holding-company-structuring-and-regulatory-considerations-for-foreign-banks/</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/04/14/us-intermediate-holding-company-structuring-and-regulatory-considerations-for-foreign-banks/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 14 Apr 2014 13:33:36 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/?p=62250?d=20141215163128EST</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The Federal Reserve&#8217;s Dodd-Frank enhanced prudential standards (“EPS”) final rule requires a foreign banking organization with $50 billion or more in U.S. non-branch/agency assets (“Foreign Bank”) to place virtually all of its U.S. subsidiaries underneath a top-tier U.S. intermediate holding company (“IHC”). The IHC will be subject to U.S. Basel III, capital planning, Dodd-Frank stress [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Kobi Kastiel, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Monday, April 14, 2014 </em><div style="background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px"><strong>Editor's Note: </strong> The following post comes to us from <a href="http://www.davispolk.com/lawyers/luigi-deghenghi/" target="_blank">Luigi L. De Ghenghi</a> and <a href="http://www.davispolk.com/lawyers/andrew-fei/" target="_blank">Andrew S. Fei</a>, attorneys in the Financial Institutions Group at Davis Polk &amp; Wardwell LLP, and is based on a Davis Polk client memorandum; the full publication, including diagrams, tables, and flowcharts, is available <a href="http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/U.S.Intermediate.Holding.Company.Structuring.and_.Regulatory.Considerations.for_.Foreign.Banks_.pdf" target="_blank">here</a>.
</div></hgroup><p>The Federal Reserve&#8217;s Dodd-Frank enhanced prudential standards (“EPS”) final rule requires a foreign banking organization with $50 billion or more in U.S. non-branch/agency assets (“Foreign Bank”) to place virtually all of its U.S. subsidiaries underneath a top-tier U.S. intermediate holding company (“IHC”). The IHC will be subject to U.S. Basel III, capital planning, Dodd-Frank stress testing, liquidity, risk management requirements and other U.S. EPS on a consolidated basis.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/04/14/us-intermediate-holding-company-structuring-and-regulatory-considerations-for-foreign-banks/#more-62250" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading US Intermediate Holding Company: Structuring and Regulatory Considerations for Foreign Banks">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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		<title>Dodd-Frank Enhanced Prudential Standards for Foreign Banks with Limited US Footprints</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/03/26/dodd-frank-enhanced-prudential-standards-for-foreign-banks-with-limited-us-footprints/</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/03/26/dodd-frank-enhanced-prudential-standards-for-foreign-banks-with-limited-us-footprints/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 26 Mar 2014 13:02:59 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/?p=61744?d=20141215164306EST</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The Federal Reserve has issued a final rule adopting a tiered approach for applying Dodd-Frank enhanced prudential standards to foreign banking organizations (“FBOs”). Under the tiered approach the most burdensome requirements (e.g., the requirement to establish a top-tier U.S. intermediate holding company) will only apply to FBOs with large U.S. operations, whereas fewer requirements will [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Kobi Kastiel, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Wednesday, March 26, 2014 </em><div style="background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px"><strong>Editor's Note: </strong> The following post comes to us from <a href="http://www.davispolk.com/lawyers/luigi-deghenghi/" target="_blank">Luigi L. De Ghenghi</a> and <a href="http://www.davispolk.com/lawyers/andrew-fei/" target="_blank">Andrew S. Fei</a>, attorneys in the Financial Institutions Group at Davis Polk &amp; Wardwell LLP, and is based on a Davis Polk client memorandum; the full publication, including diagrams, tables, and flowcharts, is available <a href="http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/03.24.14.DoddFrank.Enhanced.Prudential.Standards.for_.Foreign.Banks_.with_.Limited.U.S.Footprints.pdf" target="_blank">here</a>.
</div></hgroup><p>The Federal Reserve has issued a final rule adopting a tiered approach for applying Dodd-Frank enhanced prudential standards to foreign banking organizations (“FBOs”). Under the tiered approach the most burdensome requirements (<em>e.g.</em>, the requirement to establish a top-tier U.S. intermediate holding company) will <em>only</em> apply to FBOs with large U.S. operations, whereas fewer requirements will apply to FBOs with limited U.S. footprints.</p>
<p>We have summarized below the Dodd-Frank enhanced prudential standards that will apply to the following FBOs with limited U.S. footprints:</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/03/26/dodd-frank-enhanced-prudential-standards-for-foreign-banks-with-limited-us-footprints/#more-61744" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Dodd-Frank Enhanced Prudential Standards for Foreign Banks with Limited US Footprints">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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		<title>Dodd-Frank Enhanced Prudential Standards for U.S. Bank Holding Companies and Foreign Banks</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/02/27/dodd-frank-enhanced-prudential-standards-for-u-s-bank-holding-companies-and-foreign-banks/</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/02/27/dodd-frank-enhanced-prudential-standards-for-u-s-bank-holding-companies-and-foreign-banks/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 27 Feb 2014 14:20:47 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/?p=60391?d=20141215165456EST</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Pursuant to Section 165 of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Federal Reserve has issued a final rule to establish enhanced prudential standards for large U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) and foreign banking organizations (FBOs). U.S. BHCs: The final rule represents the latest in a series of U.S. regulations that apply heightened standards to large U.S. BHCs. As [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Kobi Kastiel, Co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Thursday, February 27, 2014 </em><div style="background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px"><strong>Editor's Note: </strong> The following post comes to us from <a href="http://www.davispolk.com/lawyers/luigi-deghenghi/" target="_blank">Luigi L. De Ghenghi</a> and <a href="http://www.davispolk.com/lawyers/andrew-fei/" target="_blank">Andrew S. Fei</a>, and is based on two Davis Polk publications; the full publications, including visuals, tables, flowcharts and timelines, are available <a href="http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/Visual.Summary.US_.Bank_.Holding.Companies.Dodd_.Frank_.Enhanced.Prudential.Standards.pdf" target="_blank">here</a> (focusing on U.S. bank holding companies) and <a href="http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/Visual.Summary.Foreign%20Banks.Dodd_.Frank_.Enhanced.Prudential.Standards.Final_.Rule_.pdf" target="_blank">here</a> (focusing on foreign banks).
</div></hgroup><p>Pursuant to Section 165 of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Federal Reserve has issued a final rule to establish enhanced prudential standards for large U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) and foreign banking organizations (FBOs).</p>
<p><strong>U.S. BHCs: </strong>The final rule represents the latest in a series of U.S. regulations that apply heightened standards to large U.S. BHCs. As the graphic below illustrates, under the emerging post-Dodd-Frank prudential regulatory landscape for U.S. BHCs, the number and stringency of prudential standards generally increase with the size of the banking organization.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/02/27/dodd-frank-enhanced-prudential-standards-for-u-s-bank-holding-companies-and-foreign-banks/#more-60391" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Dodd-Frank Enhanced Prudential Standards for U.S. Bank Holding Companies and Foreign Banks">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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		<title>Basel Committee’s Revisions to the Basel III Leverage Ratio</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/01/24/basel-committees-revisions-to-the-basel-iii-leverage-ratio/</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/01/24/basel-committees-revisions-to-the-basel-iii-leverage-ratio/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 24 Jan 2014 14:02:59 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/?p=58353?d=20141202155712EST</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[In January 2014, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision finalized its revisions to the Basel III leverage ratio. Compared to its June 2013 proposed revisions, the Basel Committee has made several important changes to the denominator of the Basel III leverage ratio, including with respect to the treatment of derivatives, securities financing transactions and certain [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Margaret E. Tahyar, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, on Friday, January 24, 2014 </em><div style="background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px"><strong>Editor's Note: </strong> <a href="http://www.davispolk.com/lawyers/margaret-tahyar/" target="_blank">Margaret E. Tahyar</a> is a partner in the Financial Institutions Group at Davis Polk &amp; Wardwell LLP. The following post is based on the introduction to a Davis Polk client memorandum by <a href="http://www.davispolk.com/lawyers/luigi-deghenghi/" target="_blank">Luigi L. De Ghenghi</a> and <a href="http://www.davispolk.com/lawyers/andrew-fei/" target="_blank">Andrew S. Fei</a>; the full publication, including visuals, tables, timelines and formulas, is available <a href="http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/01.21.14.Revised.Basel_.III_.Leverage.Ratio_.pdf" target="_blank">here</a>.
</div></hgroup><p>In January 2014, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision finalized its revisions to the Basel III leverage ratio. Compared to its June 2013 <em>proposed</em> revisions, the Basel Committee has made several important changes to the denominator of the Basel III leverage ratio, including with respect to the treatment of derivatives, securities financing transactions and certain off-balance sheet items.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/01/24/basel-committees-revisions-to-the-basel-iii-leverage-ratio/#more-58353" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Basel Committee’s Revisions to the Basel III Leverage Ratio">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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		<title>Proposed Changes to Basel III Leverage Ratio Framework</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/07/29/proposed-changes-to-basel-iii-leverage-ratio-framework/</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/07/29/proposed-changes-to-basel-iii-leverage-ratio-framework/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 29 Jul 2013 13:12:30 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/?p=50038?d=20150112113511EST</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[On the heels of publishing the U.S. Basel III final rule, the U.S. banking agencies have proposed higher leverage capital requirements for the eight U.S. bank holding companies that have been identified as global systemically important banks (“Covered BHCs”) and their insured depository institution (“IDI”) subsidiaries. The higher leverage capital requirements, which we are calling [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Margaret E. Tahyar, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, on Monday, July 29, 2013 </em><div style="background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px"><strong>Editor's Note: </strong> <a href="http://www.davispolk.com/lawyers/margaret-tahyar/" target="_blank">Margaret E. Tahyar</a> is a partner in the Financial Institutions Group at Davis Polk &amp; Wardwell LLP. The following post is based on the introduction to a Davis Polk client memorandum by <a href="http://www.davispolk.com/lawyers/luigi-deghenghi/" target="_blank">Luigi L. De Ghenghi</a> and <a href="http://www.davispolk.com/lawyers/andrew-fei/" target="_blank">Andrew S. Fei</a>; the full publication, including visuals, tables, timelines and formulas, is available <a href="http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/7a0a4791-d6cb-4248-8ff0-3f8968a19dab/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/55dacc73-e480-42a3-9524-425fb2ffca3a/07.19.13.Basel.3.Leverage.pdf" target="_blank">here</a>.
</div></hgroup><p>On the heels of publishing the U.S. Basel III final rule, the U.S. banking agencies have proposed higher leverage capital requirements for the eight U.S. bank holding companies that have been identified as global systemically important banks (“Covered BHCs”) and their insured depository institution (“IDI”) subsidiaries. The higher leverage capital requirements, which we are calling the American Add-on, build upon the minimum Basel III supplementary leverage ratio in the U.S. Basel III final rule.</p>
<p>The proposed American Add-on would require a Covered BHC’s IDI subsidiaries to maintain a Basel III supplementary leverage ratio of at least 6% to be considered well-capitalized under the prompt corrective action framework. The American Add-on also requires Covered BHCs to maintain a leverage buffer that would function in a similar way to the capital conservation buffer in the U.S. Basel III final rule. A Covered BHC that does not maintain a Basel III supplementary leverage ratio of greater than 5%, i.e., a buffer of more than 2% on top of the 3% minimum, would be subject to increasingly stringent restrictions on its ability to make capital distributions and discretionary bonus payments. The proposed effective date of the American Add-on is January 1, 2018.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/07/29/proposed-changes-to-basel-iii-leverage-ratio-framework/#more-50038" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Proposed Changes to Basel III Leverage Ratio Framework">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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		<title>Basel Committee Revises Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/02/03/basel-committee-revises-basel-iii-liquidity-coverage-ratio/</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/02/03/basel-committee-revises-basel-iii-liquidity-coverage-ratio/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Sun, 03 Feb 2013 16:46:41 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/?p=39741?d=20150105103714EST</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The Basel Committee has made significant revisions to the Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio (“LCR”). The revised LCR standards allow banks to use a broader range of liquid assets to meet their liquidity buffer and relax some of the run-off assumptions that banks must make in calculating their net cash outflows. The revised standards also [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Noam Noked, co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Sunday, February 3, 2013 </em><div style="background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px"><strong>Editor's Note: </strong> This post is based on a Davis Polk publication by <a href="http://www.davispolk.com/lawyers/luigi-deghenghi/" target="_blank">Luigi L. De Ghenghi</a>, <a href="http://www.davispolk.com/lawyers/andrew-fei/" target="_blank">Andrew S. Fei</a> and other Davis Polk attorneys; the full version, including annexes, is available <a href="http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/cac0b00d-19d4-4d21-b633-ebe47dd039c4/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ec4a815a-d076-46e9-abaf-0690af6a0d59/011713_Basel_III_LCR.pdf" target="_blank">here</a>.
</div></hgroup><p>The Basel Committee has made significant <a href="http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.pdf" target="_blank">revisions </a>to the Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio (“<strong>LCR</strong>”). The revised LCR standards allow banks to use a broader range of liquid assets to meet their liquidity buffer and relax some of the run-off assumptions that banks must make in calculating their net cash outflows. The revised standards also clarify that banks may dip below the minimum LCR requirement during periods of stress. The Basel Committee expects national regulators to implement the LCR on a phased-in basis beginning on January 1, 2015. The Basel Committee will also press ahead with its review of the Basel III Net Stable Funding Ratio (“<strong>NSFR</strong>”).</p>
<p>While the Federal Reserve has expressed its intent to implement some version of the LCR and other Basel III liquidity standards in the United States, the scope, timing and nature of U.S. implementation is currently unclear. This memorandum and the accompanying tables explore key aspects of the revised LCR standards and issues relating to their implementation in the United States.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/02/03/basel-committee-revises-basel-iii-liquidity-coverage-ratio/#more-39741" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Basel Committee Revises Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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		<title>Fed Begins 2013 CCAR Capital Planning Process for Large Banks</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/12/03/fed-begins-2013-ccar-capital-planning-process-for-large-banks/</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/12/03/fed-begins-2013-ccar-capital-planning-process-for-large-banks/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 03 Dec 2012 13:50:39 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/?p=36855?d=20150113134743EST</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The Federal Reserve launched the 2013 capital planning and stress testing process for large bank holding companies (“BHCs”) with the publication, on November 9, 2012, of two sets of instructions: one set for the 19 BHCs that participated in the 2011 Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (“CCAR”) process (“CCAR BHCs”) and another set for the [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Noam Noked, co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Monday, December 3, 2012 </em><div style="background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px"><strong>Editor's Note: </strong> The following post comes to us from <a href="http://www.davispolk.com/lawyers/luigi-deghenghi/" target="_blank">Luigi L. De Ghenghi</a> and <a href="http://www.davispolk.com/lawyers/andrew-fei/" target="_blank">Andrew S. Fei</a>, attorneys in the Financial Institutions Group at Davis Polk &amp; Wardwell LLP. This post is based on a Davis Polk publication by Mr. De Ghenghi, Mr. Fei, and other Davis Polk attorneys; the full version, including footnotes and appendix, is available <a href="http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/a531f098-49f8-4d38-a462-37ba2a1805d2/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/78874f7c-8fe8-40c2-a6fe-39335c0f6835/111412_CCAR.pdf" target="_blank">here</a>.
</div></hgroup><p>The Federal Reserve launched the 2013 capital planning and stress testing process for large bank holding companies (“BHCs”) with the publication, on November 9, 2012, of two sets of instructions: one set for the 19 BHCs that participated in the 2011 Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (“CCAR”) process (“CCAR BHCs”) and another set for the 11 other U.S.-domiciled, top-tier BHCs with total consolidated assets of $50 billion or more that did not participate in the 2011 CCAR process (“non-CCAR BHCs”). On the same day, the Federal Reserve joined with other U.S. banking agencies to announce that recent proposals to implement Basel III in the United States will not become effective on January 1, 2013.</p>
<p>The Federal Reserve’s instructions for the CCAR BHCs, which reveal how the Dodd-Frank Act’s stress testing requirements will be integrated with the Federal Reserve’s capital planning requirements, are instructive for the non-CCAR BHCs that will become subject to Dodd-Frank stress-testing requirements in the 2014 capital planning cycle. Similarly, nonbank financial companies designated by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”) for supervision by the Federal Reserve will be subject to Dodd-Frank stress-testing requirements and, under a proposal by the Federal Reserve, would also be required to submit annual capital plans to the Federal Reserve.</p>
<p>For the CCAR BHCs, the two most significant changes from the 2012 process are:</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/12/03/fed-begins-2013-ccar-capital-planning-process-for-large-banks/#more-36855" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Fed Begins 2013 CCAR Capital Planning Process for Large Banks">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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		<title>Federal Reserve’s Chinese Bank Determination Has Broader Implications</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/05/24/federal-reserves-chinese-bank-determination-has-broader-implications/</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/05/24/federal-reserves-chinese-bank-determination-has-broader-implications/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 24 May 2012 13:15:06 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/?p=29127?d=20150113142512EST</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The Federal Reserve’s decision this week to confer Comprehensive Consolidated Supervision (“CCS”) status to three state-owned Chinese banks has been long awaited and paves the way for major Chinese banks to enter retail commercial banking in the United States by acquiring U.S. banks. We view the Federal Reserve’s decision, which is the first CCS determination [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Margaret E. Tahyar, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, on Thursday, May 24, 2012 </em><div style="background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px"><strong>Editor's Note: </strong> <a href="http://www.davispolk.com/lawyers/margaret-tahyar/" target="_blank">Margaret E. Tahyar</a> is a partner in Davis Polk &amp; Wardwell LLP’s Financial Institutions Group. This post is based on a Davis Polk publication by Ms. Tahyar, <a href="http://www.davispolk.com/lawyers/luigi-deghenghi/" target="_blank">Luigi De Ghenghi</a>, <a href="http://www.davispolk.com/lawyers/andrew-fei/" target="_blank">Andrew Fei</a>, and other Davis Polk attorneys; the full version is available <a href="http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/d1083c6b-1b0b-405a-83a8-93949b4821f7/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/cb62e13f-37a1-4eed-b748-990d2afa46d5/051112_China_CCS.pdf" target="_blank">here</a>.
</div></hgroup><p>The Federal Reserve’s decision this week to confer Comprehensive Consolidated Supervision (“CCS”) status to three state-owned Chinese banks has been long awaited and paves the way for major Chinese banks to enter retail commercial banking in the United States by acquiring U.S. banks. We view the Federal Reserve’s decision, which is the first CCS determination with respect to a major jurisdiction in nearly 10 years, as encouraging for banks from other emerging economies that wish to expand their activities in the United States by acquiring U.S. banks or electing to become financial holding companies (“FHCs”). Since many developed economies have attained CCS status, the key markets that might, over time, indirectly benefit from the China CCS determination include Dubai, India, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore and South Africa. Brazilian and Mexican banks already benefit from earlier CCS determinations. There are, however, a few lessons to be learned from the Chinese experience, which we take to mean that CCS determinations will require patience and persistence. These lessons are:</p>
<ul>
<li>A willingness on the part of the Chinese government and major Chinese banks to make the CCS determination a policy priority across a range of trade, economic and strategic relationships;</li>
<li>A willingness to invest in smaller U.S. community and regional banks by Chinese banks with a traditional commercial banking profile;</li>
<li>A strong, reciprocal desire by U.S. financial institutions to enter or expand their presence in the Chinese market;</li>
<li>A determined effort on the part of the Chinese government and Chinese regulatory authorities to enhance their overall supervisory framework, as well as their anti-money laundering controls; and</li>
<li>An appreciation that, in today’s environment, CCS determinations may be incremental and more likely to be made on a bank-by-bank basis (or at least with respect to similar banks in the same country).</li>
</ul>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/05/24/federal-reserves-chinese-bank-determination-has-broader-implications/#more-29127" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Federal Reserve’s Chinese Bank Determination Has Broader Implications">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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