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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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	<description>The leading online blog in the fields of corporate governance and financial regulation.</description>
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		<title>Delaware Corporations Seek to Counter Forum Shopping</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/02/14/delaware-corporations-seek-to-counter-forum-shopping/</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/02/14/delaware-corporations-seek-to-counter-forum-shopping/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 14 Feb 2012 14:36:07 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Court Cases]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Practitioner Publications]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Charter & bylaws]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Delaware articles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Delaware law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Forum selection]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[In re Revlon]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[In response to concerns that the plaintiffs&#8217; bar is rushing [1] to sue Delaware corporations &#8220;anywhere but Delaware,&#8221; to avoid the predictability and speed of Delaware courts and potentially to obtain larger settlements, 195 Delaware corporations (including Chevron, DIRECTV, Life Technologies and 24 other members of the S&#38;P 500) have adopted or proposed adopting charter [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Claudia H. Allen, Neal, Gerber & Eisenberg LLP, on Tuesday, February 14, 2012 </em><div style="background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px"><strong>Editor's Note: </strong> <a href="http://www.ngelaw.com/callen/" target="_blank">Claudia H. Allen</a> is chair of the Corporate Governance Practice Group at Neal, Gerber &amp; Eisenberg LLP. This post discusses a study by Ms. Allen, available <a href="http://www.ngelaw.com/pubs/uniEntity.aspx?xpST=PubDetail&amp;pub=623" target="_blank">here</a>. This post is part of the <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/the-delaware-law-series/">Delaware law series</a>, which is co-sponsored by the Forum and Corporation Service Company; links to other posts in the series are available <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/the-delaware-law-series/">here</a>.
</div></hgroup><p><a name="1b"></a>In response to concerns that the plaintiffs&#8217; bar is rushing <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/02/14/delaware-corporations-seek-to-counter-forum-shopping#1">[1]</a> to sue Delaware corporations &#8220;anywhere but Delaware,&#8221; to avoid the predictability and speed of Delaware courts and potentially to obtain larger settlements, 195 Delaware corporations (including Chevron, DIRECTV, Life Technologies and 24 other members of the S&amp;P 500) have adopted or proposed adopting charter or bylaw provisions requiring that derivative actions, fiduciary duty claims and other intra-corporate disputes be litigated exclusively in the Delaware <a name="2b"></a>Court of Chancery. Among other things, these provisions seek to address the phenomenon of Delaware corporations facing parallel, competing litigation in Delaware and another state or in federal court, <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/02/14/delaware-corporations-seek-to-counter-forum-shopping#2">[2]</a> often in connection with M &amp; A activity. The January 2012 edition of my <a href="http://www.ngelaw.com/pubs/uniEntity.aspx?xpST=PubDetail&amp;pub=623" target="_blank"><em>Study of Delaware Forum Selection in Charters and Bylaws</em></a> analyzes these provisions and the trends they reveal.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/02/14/delaware-corporations-seek-to-counter-forum-shopping/#more-25698" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Delaware Corporations Seek to Counter Forum Shopping">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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		<title>Study of Majority Voting in Director Elections</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2007/11/23/study-of-majority-voting-in-director-elections/</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2007/11/23/study-of-majority-voting-in-director-elections/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 23 Nov 2007 22:24:26 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Boards of Directors]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Empirical Research]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Majority voting]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[We have recently released the November 2007 edition of the Study of Majority Voting in Director Elections, which demonstrates that majority voting for the election of directors, which has been characterized by its advocates as a tool for increasing director accountability, has become the prevailing election standard among large, public companies. As issuers prepare for [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Robert Jackson, Managing Editor, Harvard Law School Corporate Governance Blog, on Friday, November 23, 2007 </em><div style="background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px"><strong>Editor's Note: </strong> This post comes to us from <a href="http://www.ngelaw.com/attorney/bio.aspx?ID=723">Claudia H. Allen</a> of <a href="http://www.ngelaw.com/home.aspx" target="_blank">Neal, Gerber &amp; Eisenberg LLP</a>.
</div></hgroup><p>We have recently released the November 2007 edition of the <em><a href="http://www.ngelaw.com/files/Uploads/Documents/majoritystudy111207.pdf" target="_blank">Study of Majority Voting in Director Elections</a></em>, which demonstrates that majority voting for the election of directors, which has been characterized by its advocates as a tool for increasing director accountability, has become the prevailing election standard among large, public companies. As issuers prepare for the 2008 proxy season, a few statistics and examples drawn from the <em>Study</em> underscore that majority voting has become a relatively mature, as well as widespread, movement.</p>
<p><strong>Majority Voting in the S&amp;P 500 and Fortune 500.</strong> 66% of the companies in the S&amp;P 500 and over 57% of the companies in the Fortune 500 have adopted a form of majority voting, notwithstanding robust levels of merger and acquisition activity early in 2007 that resulted in several firms with majority voting going private. By way of contrast, when the <em>Study </em>was initially published in 2006, only 16% of the companies in the S&amp;P 500 had adopted a form of majority voting.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2007/11/23/study-of-majority-voting-in-director-elections/#more-312" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Study of Majority Voting in Director Elections">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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