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		<title>Novel Defensive Tactics Against Activist Shareholders</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/10/18/novel-defensive-tactics-against-activist-shareholders/</link>
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		<pubDate>Wed, 18 Oct 2017 13:03:28 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description><![CDATA[In the past year, more than 50 publicly traded companies, including 19 on the Standard &#38; Poor’s 500 index, have amended their bylaws to address the potential for a so-called “placeholder slate” of directors. The bylaw amendments began to appear in response to a tactic used last year to end-run typical advance notice bylaws for [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Rodd Schreiber, Richard Grossman, and Robert Saunders, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, on Wednesday, October 18, 2017 </em><div style="background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px"><strong>Editor's Note: </strong> <a href="https://www.skadden.com/professionals/s/schreiber-rodd-m">Rodd Schreiber</a>, <a class="external" href="https://www.skadden.com/professionals/g/grossman-richard-j" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Richard Grossman</a>, and <a href="https://www.skadden.com/professionals/s/saunders-robert-s">Robert Saunders</a> are partners at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &amp; Flom LLP. This post is based on a Skadden publication by Mr. Schreiber, Mr. Grossman, Mr. Saunders, <a href="https://www.skadden.com/professionals/c/clark-david-r">David Clark</a>, and <a href="https://www.skadden.com/professionals/c/cohn-rachel-e">Rachel Cohn</a>, and is part of the <a href="http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/the-delaware-law-series/">Delaware law series</a>; links to other posts in the series are available <a href="http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/the-delaware-law-series/">here</a>. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2291577" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?hl=en&amp;q=https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id%3D2291577&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1508339052273000&amp;usg=AFQjCNEK5g3NdQS-Z7TDgzzeezPWSz5E0Q">The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism</a> by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/08/19/the-long-term-effects-of-hedge-fund-activism/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?hl=en&amp;q=https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/08/19/the-long-term-effects-of-hedge-fund-activism/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1508339052273000&amp;usg=AFQjCNFqr72lyhzty3SzIoYtdbW5drjl5g">here</a>); <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=2&amp;ved=0ahUKEwjegejWpt7UAhXCGT4KHeqRD64QFggwMAE&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fssrn.com%2Fabstract%3D2248111&amp;usg=AFQjCNG1Yy2O4mShf16j0kfW5CyTVwcwkQ" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?hl=en&amp;q=https://www.google.com/url?sa%3Dt%26rct%3Dj%26q%3D%26esrc%3Ds%26source%3Dweb%26cd%3D2%26ved%3D0ahUKEwjegejWpt7UAhXCGT4KHeqRD64QFggwMAE%26url%3Dhttps%253A%252F%252Fssrn.com%252Fabstract%253D2248111%26usg%3DAFQjCNG1Yy2O4mShf16j0kfW5CyTVwcwkQ&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1508339052273000&amp;usg=AFQjCNG-zOAIVWgU6V6NkWqSMiRNRdCYCQ">The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value</a> by Lucian Bebchuk (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/04/22/the-myth-that-insulating-boards-serves-long-term-value/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?hl=en&amp;q=https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/04/22/the-myth-that-insulating-boards-serves-long-term-value/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1508339052273000&amp;usg=AFQjCNG1qXBt5SGveKK6w1g26wbSXc-D_Q">here</a>); and <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2921901" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?hl=en&amp;q=https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id%3D2921901&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1508339052273000&amp;usg=AFQjCNHQ7pA0uvk0xGSJdDy_-5fAcRhFXg">Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System</a> by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/02/23/who-bleeds-when-the-wolves-bite/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" data-saferedirecturl="https://www.google.com/url?hl=en&amp;q=https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/02/23/who-bleeds-when-the-wolves-bite/&amp;source=gmail&amp;ust=1508339052273000&amp;usg=AFQjCNEV7gkEFMJpSRFYUvW1H9_0izhedA">here</a>).
</div></hgroup><p>In the past year, more than 50 publicly traded companies, including 19 on the Standard &amp; Poor’s 500 index, have amended their bylaws to address the potential for a so-called “placeholder slate” of directors. The bylaw amendments began to appear in response to a tactic used last year to end-run typical advance notice bylaws for director nominations. However, neither the bylaw amendments nor the placeholder-slate tactic have been tested in court, leaving their ultimate fate undetermined even as the adoption of these amendments appears to be growing.</p>
<p>In the summer of 2016, activist hedge fund Corvex Management LP announced its intent to oust all 10 members of the board of The Williams Companies, Inc. <a href="http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/corvex-issues-open-letter-to-williams-stockholders-regarding-notice-to-replace-entire-williams-board-of-directors-300317583.html">The move</a> was part of a two-year battle for influence over Williams, during which Corvex’s founder, Keith Meister, and five other Williams directors resigned over strategic disputes with management, culminating in a failed $33 billion merger that would have created the nation’s largest natural gas transporter.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/10/18/novel-defensive-tactics-against-activist-shareholders/#more-101908" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Novel Defensive Tactics Against Activist Shareholders">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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