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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Some Thoughts for Boards of Directors in 2021</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/12/08/some-thoughts-for-boards-of-directors-in-2021/</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/12/08/some-thoughts-for-boards-of-directors-in-2021/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 08 Dec 2020 14:31:17 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=135173?d=20201208093117EST</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Many of the challenges that corporations and their boards have encountered in 2020 will continue to be front and center in 2021, including the COVID-19 pandemic, the movement to address racial injustice and broad-based socioeconomic inequality, an accelerating sense of urgency around climate change, technological innovation and an evolving political and regulatory climate. These trends [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Martin Lipton, Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz, on Tuesday, December 8, 2020 </em><div style="background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px"><strong>Editor's Note: </strong> <a class="external" href="http://www.wlrk.com/mlipton/" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Martin Lipton</a> is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen &amp; Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Lipton, <a class="external" href="https://www.wlrk.com/attorney/sarosenblum/" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Steven A. Rosenblum</a>, <a class="external" href="https://www.wlrk.com/attorney/klcain/" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Karessa L. Cain</a>, <a class="external" href="https://www.wlrk.com/attorney/hclark/" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Hannah Clark</a>, and <a class="external" href="https://www.wlrk.com/attorney/bassad/" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Bita Assad</a>. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes <a class="external" href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3544978" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance</a> by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/03/02/the-illusory-promise-of-stakeholder-governance/">here</a>); <a class="external" href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3677155" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain</a> by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/08/25/for-whom-corporate-leaders-bargain/">here</a>); and <a class="external" href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3461924" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Toward Fair and Sustainable Capitalism</a> by Leo E. Strine, Jr (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/10/01/toward-fair-and-sustainable-capitalism/">here</a>).
</div></hgroup><p>Many of the challenges that corporations and their boards have encountered in 2020 will continue to be front and center in 2021, including the COVID-19 pandemic, the movement to address racial injustice and broad-based socioeconomic inequality, an accelerating sense of urgency around climate change, technological innovation and an evolving political and regulatory climate. These trends have underscored the key themes of sustainability, resilience and corporate purpose, and are prompting new perspectives on the ways that corporations must operate to manage the multiple stakeholder interests that are critical to the health and long-term success of their businesses. And, in this environment, boards are seeking to optimize their functioning and leadership role to navigate these challenges as well as the evolving expectations of stakeholders.</p>
<p>Summarized below are highlights and practical suggestions for corporations and boards to consider in the new year.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/12/08/some-thoughts-for-boards-of-directors-in-2021/#more-135173" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Some Thoughts for Boards of Directors in 2021">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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		<title>Spotlight on Boards</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/12/03/spotlight-on-boards-8/</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/12/03/spotlight-on-boards-8/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 03 Dec 2020 14:08:40 +0000</pubDate>
<!-- 		<dc:creator><![CDATA[]]></dc:creator> -->
				<category><![CDATA[Accounting & Disclosure]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=135029?d=20201203090840EST</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The ever-evolving challenges facing corporate boards prompt periodic updates to a snapshot of what is expected from the board of directors of a public company—not just the legal rules, or the principles published by institutional investors and various corporate and investor associations, but also the aspirational “best practices” that have come to have equivalent influence [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Martin Lipton, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, on Thursday, December 3, 2020 </em><div style="background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px"><strong>Editor's Note: </strong> <a class="external" href="http://www.wlrk.com/mlipton/" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Martin Lipton</a> is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen &amp; Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Lipton, <a href="https://www.wlrk.com/attorney/sarosenblum/">Steven A. Rosenblum</a>, <a href="https://www.wlrk.com/attorney/klcain/">Karessa L. Cain</a>, <a href="https://www.wlrk.com/attorney/hclark/">Hannah Clark</a>, and <a href="https://www.wlrk.com/attorney/bassad/">Bita Assad</a>. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3544978">The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance</a> by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/03/02/the-illusory-promise-of-stakeholder-governance/">here</a>); <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3677155">For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain</a> by Lucian A. Bebchuk, Kobi Kastiel, and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/08/25/for-whom-corporate-leaders-bargain/">here</a>); and <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3461924">Toward Fair and Sustainable Capitalism</a> by Leo E. Strine, Jr (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/10/01/toward-fair-and-sustainable-capitalism/">here</a>).
</div></hgroup><p>The ever-evolving challenges facing corporate boards prompt periodic updates to a snapshot of what is expected from the board of directors of a public company—not just the legal rules, or the principles published by institutional investors and various corporate and investor associations, but also the aspirational “best practices” that have come to have equivalent influence on board and company behavior. The coronavirus pandemic and resulting economic turbulence, combined with the wide embrace of ESG, stakeholder governance and sustainable long-term investment strategies, is propelling a decisive inflection point in the responsibilities of boards of directors. The 2020 statement of corporate purpose by the World Economic Forum is a concise and cogent reflection of the current thinking of most of the leading corporations, institutional investors, asset managers and their organizations, as well as governments and regulators outside the United States:</p>
<blockquote><p>The purpose of a company is to engage all its stakeholders in shared and sustained value creation. In creating such value, a company serves not only its shareholders, but all its stakeholders—employees, customers, suppliers, local communities and society at large. The best way to understand and harmonize the divergent interests of all stakeholders is through a shared commitment to policies and decisions that strengthen the long-term prosperity of a company.</p></blockquote>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/12/03/spotlight-on-boards-8/#more-135029" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Spotlight on Boards">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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		<title>On the Purpose and Objective of the Corporation</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/08/05/on-the-purpose-and-objective-of-the-corporation/</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/08/05/on-the-purpose-and-objective-of-the-corporation/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 05 Aug 2020 12:59:42 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=131937?d=20200805085942EDT</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[As we approach the first anniversary of the Business Roundtable’s abandonment of shareholder primacy and embrace of stakeholder governance, and the fourth anniversary of our development for the World Economic Forum of The New Paradigm: A Roadmap for an Implicit Corporate Governance Partnership Between Corporations and Investors to Achieve Sustainable Long-Term Investment and Growth, we [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Martin Lipton, Steven A. Rosenblum, and William Savitt, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, on Wednesday, August 5, 2020 </em><div style="background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px"><strong>Editor's Note: </strong> <a class="external" href="http://www.wlrk.com/mlipton/" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Martin Lipton</a> is a founding partner specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy, and <a href="https://www.wlrk.com/attorney/sarosenblum/">Steven A. Rosenblum</a> and <a href="https://www.wlrk.com/attorney/wsavitt/">William Savitt</a> are partners Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen &amp; Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Lipton, Mr. Rosenblum, Mr. Savitt, <a href="https://www.wlrk.com/attorney/klcain/">Karessa L. Cain</a>, <a href="https://www.wlrk.com/attorney/hclark/">Hannah Clark</a>, and <a href="https://www.wlrk.com/attorney/bassad/">Bita Assad</a>. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3544978">The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance</a> by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/03/02/the-illusory-promise-of-stakeholder-governance/">here</a>); and <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3461924">Toward Fair and Sustainable Capitalism</a> by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/10/01/toward-fair-and-sustainable-capitalism/">here</a>).
</div></hgroup><p>As we approach the first anniversary of the<a href="https://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/WLRKMemos/WLRK/WLRK.26511.19.pdf"> Business Roundtable’s</a> abandonment of shareholder primacy and embrace of stakeholder governance, and the fourth anniversary of our development for the <a href="https://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/AttorneyPubs/WLRK.25960.16.pdf">World Economic Forum</a> of <em>The New Paradigm: A Roadmap for an Implicit Corporate Governance Partnership Between Corporations and Investors to Achieve Sustainable Long-Term Investment and Growth</em>, we thought it useful to consider in broader context the key issues of corporate governance and investor stewardship today. While there is no universal consensus, the question underlying these issues can be expressed as: What is the corporation trying to achieve? What is its <em>objective</em>?</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/08/05/on-the-purpose-and-objective-of-the-corporation/#more-131937" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading On the Purpose and Objective of the Corporation">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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		<title>Some Thoughts for Boards of Directors in 2020: A Mid-Year Update</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/07/02/some-thoughts-for-boards-of-directors-in-2020-a-mid-year-update/</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/07/02/some-thoughts-for-boards-of-directors-in-2020-a-mid-year-update/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 02 Jul 2020 14:15:02 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=131058?d=20200702101502EDT</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The past six months have been marked by a profound upheaval that has accelerated the growing focus on both the purpose of the corporation and the role of the board in overseeing and leading the corporation in ways that promote sustainable business success. For a number of years, there has been a growing sense of [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Martin Lipton, Steven A. Rosenblum, and William Savitt, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, on Thursday, July 2, 2020 </em><div style="background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px"><strong>Editor's Note: </strong> <a class="external" href="http://www.wlrk.com/mlipton/" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Martin Lipton</a> is a founding partner, and <a class="external" href="http://www.wlrk.com/SARosenblum/" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Steven A. Rosenblum</a>, <a class="external" href="https://w3.wlrk.com/attorney/wsavitt/" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">William Savitt</a> are partners at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen &amp; Katz. This post is based on a Wachtell Lipton memorandum by Mr. Lipton, Mr. Rosenblum, Mr. Savitt, <a class="external" href="http://www.wlrk.com/KLCain/" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Karessa L. Cain</a>, <a href="https://www.wlrk.com/attorney/hclark/" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer">Hannah Clark,</a> and <a href="https://www.wlrk.com/attorney/bita-assad/" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer">Bita Assad</a>. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3544978">The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance</a> by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Roberto Tallarita (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/03/02/the-illusory-promise-of-stakeholder-governance/">here</a>) and <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2464561">Socially Responsible Firms</a> by Alan Ferrell, Hao Liang, and Luc Renneboog (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/08/06/socially-responsible-firms/">here</a>).
</div></hgroup><p>The past six months have been marked by a profound upheaval that has accelerated the growing focus on both the purpose of the corporation and the role of the board in overseeing and leading the corporation in ways that promote sustainable business success. For a number of years, there has been a growing sense of urgency around issues such as climate change, environmental degradation, globalization, workplace inequality and the need to keep pace with rapidly evolving technologies. Then, in recent months, the COVID-19 pandemic prompted a systemic shock, which has been accompanied by a long overdue awakening regarding endemic racial injustice. The convergence of these events has accelerated the focus on environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues and stakeholder capitalism as operational and strategic imperatives that are core to corporations’ abilities to compete and succeed. The well-being of employees and other stakeholders, and the ability to engage in more sustainable ways of doing business, are not a nice-to-have luxury or a branding exercise, but rather a basic building block of corporate value. There is an essential nexus between “value” and “values.”</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/07/02/some-thoughts-for-boards-of-directors-in-2020-a-mid-year-update/#more-131058" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Some Thoughts for Boards of Directors in 2020: A Mid-Year Update">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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		<title>Reconsidering Activism in France</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/05/07/reconsidering-activism-in-france/</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/05/07/reconsidering-activism-in-france/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 May 2020 13:35:03 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=129645?d=20200507093503EDT</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[On April 27, 2020, France’s financial markets regulator, the Autorité des marchés financiers (“AMF”), released a report containing certain proposals and observations regarding shareholder activism. The report was issued following the AMF’s review of recent activism matters in France, including its recent €20m fine levied against Elliott Management for obstructing an investigation into a takeover [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Martin Lipton and Hannah Clark, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, on Thursday, May 7, 2020 </em><div style="background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px"><strong>Editor's Note: </strong> <a class="external" href="http://www.wlrk.com/mlipton/" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Martin Lipton</a> is a founding partner of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen &amp; Katz, specializing in mergers and acquisitions and matters affecting corporate policy and strategy and <a href="https://www.wlrk.com/attorney/hclark/">Hannah Clark</a> is an associate. This post is based on their Wachtell Lipton memorandum. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2291577">The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism</a> by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/08/19/the-long-term-effects-of-hedge-fund-activism/">here</a>); <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1884226&amp;rec=1&amp;srcabs=182169&amp;alg=1&amp;pos=8">The Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure</a> by Lucian Bebchuk and Robert J. Jackson Jr. (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/06/27/should-the-sec-tighten-its-13d-rules/">here</a>); <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2258083">Pre-Disclosure Accumulations by Activist Investors: Evidence and Policy</a> by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Robert J. Jackson Jr., and Wei Jiang; and <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2921901">Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System</a> by Leo E. Strine, Jr. (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/02/23/who-bleeds-when-the-wolves-bite/">here</a>).
</div></hgroup><p>On April 27, 2020, France’s financial markets regulator, the Autorité des marchés financiers (“AMF”), released a report containing certain proposals and observations regarding shareholder activism. The report was issued following the AMF’s review of recent activism matters in France, including its recent €20m fine levied against Elliott Management for obstructing an investigation into a takeover bid and failing to adequately disclose its positions in connection with the 2015 tender offer by XPO Logistics for Norbert Dentressangle.</p>
<p>In its report, the AMF recommended lowering the mandatory reporting threshold for investors to publicly disclose their ownership from 5% to 3% of the issuer’s share capital or voting rights, as is already the case in a number of other European jurisdictions. The AMF announced that it would be modifying its guidance on “quiet periods” to clarify that issuers may provide any information necessary to respond to public statements about them by activist investors, and that it would be supporting proposals to expand the required disclosures on short-selling to include information on activist investors’ exposure to debt instruments. The AMF also requested legislation to give it additional capabilities to provide rapid responses in the activist campaign context—specifically, the AMF proposed that its ability to require additional disclosures if errors or omissions have been found in public statements be expanded from issuers to also capture investors, and that the obligations imposed on bidders and targets in takeover bid situations, including due diligence obligations for public statements, also be applied to their shareholders.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/05/07/reconsidering-activism-in-france/#more-129645" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Reconsidering Activism in France">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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