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		<title>Implications of the Recent Dell Appraisal Decision</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/06/21/implications-of-the-recent-dell-appraisal-decision/</link>
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		<pubDate>Tue, 21 Jun 2016 13:31:32 +0000</pubDate>
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		<category><![CDATA[In re Appraisal of Dell]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[On May 31, Vice Chancellor Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery held that, for purposes of Delaware’s appraisal statute, the fair value of the common stock of Dell Inc. at the time of its sale to a group including the Company’s founder Michael Dell was $17.62 per share, almost a third higher than the [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Lewis R. Clayton & Stephen P. Lamb, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, on Tuesday, June 21, 2016 </em><div style="background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px"><strong>Editor's Note: </strong> <a href="https://www.paulweiss.com/professionals/partners-and-counsel/lewis-r-clayton.aspx" target="_blank">Lewis R. Clayton</a> and <a href="http://www.paulweiss.com/professionals/partners-and-counsel/stephen-p-lamb.aspx" target="_blank">Stephen Lamb</a> are partners in the Litigation Department at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton &amp; Garrison LLP. This post is based on a Paul Weiss memorandum by Mr. Clayton, Mr. Lamb, <a href="https://www.paulweiss.com/professionals/partners-and-counsel/frances-mi.aspx" target="_blank">Frances Mi</a> and <a href="https://www.paulweiss.com/professionals/associates/daniel-mason.aspx" target="_blank">Daniel Mason</a>. This post is part of the <a href="http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/the-delaware-law-series/">Delaware law series</a>; links to other posts in the series are available <a href="http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/the-delaware-law-series/">here</a>.
</div></hgroup><p>On May 31, Vice Chancellor Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery held that, for purposes of Delaware’s appraisal statute, the fair value of the common stock of Dell Inc. at the time of its sale to a group including the Company’s founder Michael Dell was $17.62 per share, almost a third higher than the $13.75 deal price. <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/06/21/implications-of-the-recent-dell-appraisal-decision/#1">[1]</a><a name="1b"></a> The decision has received a good deal of attention from the press and commentators, largely because the Court rejected the use of the transaction price as compelling evidence of fair value, despite several recent Delaware appraisal decisions that have relied heavily or exclusively on the transaction price. While the ruling may encourage some stockholders of Delaware companies to seek appraisal—particularly in management buyouts—there are powerful reasons why the decision should be limited to its particular facts.</p>
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