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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>U.S. Insider Trading Enforcement Goes Global</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/05/26/u-s-insider-trading-enforcement-goes-global/</link>
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		<pubDate>Sun, 26 May 2013 14:21:40 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/?p=45796?d=20150112120012EST</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[A recent inquiry into potential insider trading in Switzerland ahead of the acquisition of H.J. Heinz Company has drawn attention to the role of U.S. regulators in policing suspicious trading activities that take place outside of the United States. While the Heinz matter has attracted significant media attention, it is only the latest in a [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Noam Noked, co-editor, HLS Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, on Sunday, May 26, 2013 </em><div style="background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px"><strong>Editor's Note: </strong> The following post comes to us from <a href="http://www.allenovery.com/people/en-gb/Pages/Michael-Feldberg.aspx" target="_blank">Michael Feldberg</a>, partner and head of the U.S. litigation practice at Allen &amp; Overy LLP. This post is based on an Allen &amp; Overy memorandum; the full text, including footnotes, is available <a href="https://www.aohub.com/aoos/attachment_dw.action?key=Ec8teaJ9VapYSer219Q7FF7eOOGbnAEFKCLORG72fHz0%2BNbpi2jDfaB8lgiEyY1JAvAvaah9lF3d%0D%0AzoxprWhI6w%3D%3D&amp;attkey=FRbANEucS95NMLRN47z%2BeeOgEFCt8EGQJsWJiCH2WAVfnLVn2ghRGNUKS1CAKeH0&amp;fromContentView=1&amp;fromDispatchContent=true&amp;nav=FRbANEucS95NMLRN47z%2BeeOgEFCt8EGQ%2FHLCIrtYuIY%3D&amp;uid=frsvcLdHNrI%3D&amp;popup=HxapDW%2FMKd4%3D&amp;freersslink=true" target="_blank">here</a>.
</div></hgroup><p>A recent inquiry into potential insider trading in Switzerland ahead of the acquisition of H.J. Heinz Company has drawn attention to the role of U.S. regulators in policing suspicious trading activities that take place outside of the United States. While the Heinz matter has attracted significant media attention, it is only the latest in a string of similar cross-border inquiries and enforcement actions undertaken recently by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). As these matters demonstrate, the SEC has in recent years shown an increasing willingness to pursue insider trading enforcement actions with substantial international dimensions. In the words of former SEC Enforcement Chief Robert Khuzami, &#8220;offshore trading is not off-limits to U.S. law enforcement.&#8221;</p>
<p>Historically, many of the SEC&#8217;s insider trading cases with international angles were simply the outgrowth of cases that were primarily domestic in nature. In recent years, however, a number of the SEC&#8217;s insider trading matters have involved significant overseas conduct (e.g., foreign traders operating through foreign accounts) and consequently a high number of foreign defendants. In many of these matters, the jurisdictional nexus between the suspicious conduct and the U.S. market is increasingly attenuated (including at least one recent example in which the sole basis appears to have been that a particular securities transaction was cleared through a U.S. brokerage account). While individuals or firms who choose to litigate insider trading cases against the SEC may be able to raise defenses to the SEC&#8217;s arguably extraterritorial exercise of its jurisdiction under certain factual scenarios, the mere prospect of an SEC investigation – including significant legal costs and corresponding reputational impact – should cause internationally active firms to take note of the breadth and intensity of the SEC&#8217;s focus on cross-border insider trading matters.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/05/26/u-s-insider-trading-enforcement-goes-global/#more-45796" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading U.S. Insider Trading Enforcement Goes Global">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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