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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>SEC Extends Its Focus on MNPI Clearance Procedures</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/11/09/sec-extends-its-focus-on-mnpi-clearance-procedures/</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/11/09/sec-extends-its-focus-on-mnpi-clearance-procedures/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2020 14:02:02 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=134189?d=20201109090202EST</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[[On October 15, 2020], the SEC announced a settled enforcement action against a public company in connection with the company’s initiation of a stock buyback program while in possession of material, nonpublic information (“MNPI”). The Commission charged the company with violating Section 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act, which requires reporting companies to devise and maintain [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Stephen Cutler, Brad Goldberg and Nicholas Goldin, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, on Monday, November 9, 2020 </em><div style="background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px"><strong>Editor's Note: </strong> <a href="https://www.stblaw.com/our-team/news/stephen-m--cutler">Stephen Cutler</a>, <a href="https://www.stblaw.com/our-team/news/bradley-p-goldberg">Brad Goldberg</a> and <a href="https://www.stblaw.com/our-team/news/nicholas-s-goldin">Nicholas Goldin</a> are partners at Simpson Thacher &amp; Bartlett LLP. This post is based on a Simpson Thacher memorandum by Mr. Cutler, Mr. Goldberg, Mr. Goldin, <a href="https://www.stblaw.com/our-team/news/brooke-e--cucinella">Brooke Cucinella</a>, <a href="https://www.stblaw.com/our-team/news/michael-j--osnato-jr-">Michael Osnato</a> and <a href="https://www.stblaw.com/our-team/news/joshua-a-levine">Josh Levine</a>. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2122137">Insider Trading Via the Corporation</a> by Jesse Fried (discussed on the Forum <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/08/24/insider-trading-via-the-corporation/">here</a>).
</div></hgroup><p>[On October 15, 2020], the SEC announced a settled enforcement action against a public company in connection with the company’s initiation of a stock buyback program while in possession of material, nonpublic information (“MNPI”). <a class="footnote" id="1b" href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/11/09/sec-extends-its-focus-on-mnpi-clearance-procedures/#1">[1]</a> The Commission charged the company with violating Section 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act, which requires reporting companies to devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that transactions are executed, and access to company assets is permitted, only in accordance with management’s authorizations.</p>
<p>Specifically, the SEC found that the company’s decision–approved by its legal department–to enter into a Rule 10b5-1 trading plan to repurchase the company’s shares on the same day that the company resumed previously suspended, CEO-to-CEO merger discussions violated the company’s own securities trading policy, and therefore fell outside the board’s repurchase authorization. Without admitting or denying the SEC’s findings, the company agreed to the entry of a cease and desist order and to pay a $20 million penalty to settle the action.</p>
<p>The SEC’s order highlights a number of important matters for public companies:</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/11/09/sec-extends-its-focus-on-mnpi-clearance-procedures/#more-134189" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading SEC Extends Its Focus on MNPI Clearance Procedures">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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		<title>Justice Department Updates Its Guidance on Corporate Compliance Programs</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/06/29/justice-department-updates-its-guidance-on-corporate-compliance-programs/</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/06/29/justice-department-updates-its-guidance-on-corporate-compliance-programs/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 29 Jun 2020 13:03:26 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=130578?d=20200629090326EDT</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Earlier this month, the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice updated its guidance for prosecutors to use when evaluating a company’s compliance program in the context of corporate charging and settlement decisions. While the revised guidance is very similar to DOJ’s April 2019 version, it includes substantive updates in a number of areas—including regarding [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Stephen Cutler, Nicholas Goldin, David Caldwell, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, on Monday, June 29, 2020 </em><div style="background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px"><strong>Editor's Note: </strong> <a href="https://www.stblaw.com/our-team/partners/stephen-m--cutler">Stephen Cutler</a> and <a href="https://www.stblaw.com/our-team/team-member?roles=partners&amp;url=nicholas-s-goldin">Nicholas Goldin</a> are partners and <a href="https://www.stblaw.com/our-team/associates/david-h-caldwell">David Caldwell</a> is an associate at Simpson Thacher &amp; Bartlett LLP. This post is based on their Simpson Thacher memorandum.
</div></hgroup><p>Earlier this month, the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice updated its guidance for prosecutors to use when evaluating a company’s compliance program in the context of corporate charging and settlement decisions. <a class="footnote" id="1b" href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/06/29/justice-department-updates-its-guidance-on-corporate-compliance-programs/#1">[1]</a> While the revised guidance is very similar to DOJ’s April 2019 version, <a class="footnote" id="2b" href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/06/29/justice-department-updates-its-guidance-on-corporate-compliance-programs/#2">[2]</a> it includes substantive updates in a number of areas—including regarding how compliance programs are resourced, how they evolve and adapt, and how they address pre-acquisition due diligence and post-acquisition compliance integration in mergers and acquisitions.</p>
<h2>Introduction</h2>
<p>As with prior versions, the updated guidance continues to emphasize at the outset that the Criminal Division does not use any “rigid formula” to evaluate compliance programs, and instead states that each company’s risk profile requires “particularized evaluation.” The revisions (italicized below), however, add notable language with respect to the factors DOJ will consider in its individualized determination:</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/06/29/justice-department-updates-its-guidance-on-corporate-compliance-programs/#more-130578" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Justice Department Updates Its Guidance on Corporate Compliance Programs">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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