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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>The Rise of Settled Proxy Fights</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/03/22/the-rise-of-settled-proxy-fights/</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/03/22/the-rise-of-settled-proxy-fights/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 22 Mar 2017 13:28:21 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Boards of Directors]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Proxy fights]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=80160?d=20170323093812EDT</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Shareholder activists showed no signs of slowing down in 2016. These investors continue to instill fear  in corporate board rooms across America and bring their concerns to the public as illustrated by the growing number of proxy fights; 110 in 2016 alone, a 43% surge over 2012. In that time, companies have more frequently succumbed [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Jay Frankl and Steve Balet, FTI Consulting, on Wednesday, March 22, 2017 </em><div style="background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px"><strong>Editor's Note: </strong> <a class="external" href="http://www.fticonsulting.com/our-people/jason-frankl" target="_blank" rel="nofollow">Jason Frankl</a> is Senior Managing Director and <a class="external" href="http://www.fticonsulting.com/our-people/steven-balet" target="_blank" rel="nofollow">Steven Balet</a> is Managing Director at FTI Consulting. This post is based on an FTI publication by Mr. Frankl, Mr. Balet, and Merritt Moran.
</div></hgroup><p>Shareholder activists showed no signs of slowing down in 2016. These investors continue to instill fear  in corporate board rooms across America and bring their concerns to the public as illustrated by the growing number of proxy fights; 110 in 2016 alone, a 43% surge over 2012. <a class="footnote" id="1b" href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/03/22/the-rise-of-settled-proxy-fights/#1">[1]</a> In that time, companies have more frequently succumbed to these investors and at times, accepted unfavorable settlement terms instead of pushing forward and fighting through a proxy contest.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/03/22/the-rise-of-settled-proxy-fights/#more-80160" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading The Rise of Settled Proxy Fights">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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		<title>Ten Strategic Building Blocks for Shareholder Activism Preparedness</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/12/20/ten-strategic-building-blocks-for-shareholder-activism-preparedness/</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/12/20/ten-strategic-building-blocks-for-shareholder-activism-preparedness/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 20 Dec 2016 14:02:12 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Boards of Directors]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=76442?d=20161220090212EST</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Shareholder activism is a powerful term. It conjures the image of a white knight, which is ironic because these investors were called “corporate raiders” in the 1980s. A corporate raider conjures a much different image. As much as that change in terminology may seem like semantics, it is critical to understanding how to deal with [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Merritt Moran, FTI Consulting, on Tuesday, December 20, 2016 </em><div style="background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px"><strong>Editor's Note: </strong> Merritt Moran is a Business Analyst at FTI Consulting. This post is based on an FTI publication by Ms. Moran, <a href="http://www.fticonsulting.com/our-people/jason-frankl">Jason Frankl</a>, <a href="http://www.fticonsulting.com/our-people/john-j-huber">John Huber</a>, and <a href="http://www.fticonsulting.com/our-people/steven-balet">Steven Balet</a>. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2291577">The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism</a> by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang (discussed on the Forum <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/08/19/the-long-term-effects-of-hedge-fund-activism/">here</a>), and <a href="http://ssrn.com/abstract=2258083">Pre-Disclosure Accumulations by Activist Investors: Evidence and Policy</a> by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Robert J. Jackson Jr., and Wei Jiang.
</div></hgroup><p>Shareholder activism is a powerful term. It conjures the image of a white knight, which is ironic because these investors were called “corporate raiders” in the 1980s. A corporate raider conjures a much different image. As much as that change in terminology may seem like semantics, it is critical to understanding how to deal with proxy fights or hostile takeovers. The way someone is described and the language used are crucial to how that person is perceived. The perception of these so-called shareholder activists has changed so dramatically that, even though most companies’ goals are still the same, the playbook for dealing with activists is different than the playbook for corporate raiders. As such, a corresponding increase in the number of activist encounters has made that playbook required reading for all public company officers and directors. In fact, there have been more than 200 campaigns at U.S. public companies with market capitalizations greater than $1 billion in the last 10 quarters alone. <a class="footnote" id="1b" href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/12/20/ten-strategic-building-blocks-for-shareholder-activism-preparedness/#1">[1]</a></p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/12/20/ten-strategic-building-blocks-for-shareholder-activism-preparedness/#more-76442" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Ten Strategic Building Blocks for Shareholder Activism Preparedness">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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