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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Shareholder Activism and Voluntary Disclosure</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/10/21/shareholder-activism-and-voluntary-disclosure/</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/10/21/shareholder-activism-and-voluntary-disclosure/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2015 13:02:13 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Accounting & Disclosure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Corporate Elections & Voting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Empirical Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Disclosure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Incentives]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Information asymmetries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Information environment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Liquidity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Peer effects]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Peer groups]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Proxy fights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Reputation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shareholder activism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Voluntary Disclosure]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=71855?d=20151022093815EDT</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Information is the foundation on which traders form their beliefs about a company and ultimately their investment decisions. In empirical settings, information often arrives in the form of a company disclosure. Since managers have significant discretion over disclosure, researchers have extensively studied the relation between disclosure and trading via the price system. In our paper, [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Jordan Schoenfeld, University of Utah, on Wednesday, October 21, 2015 </em><div style="background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px"><strong>Editor's Note: </strong> <a href="https://faculty.utah.edu/u6001086-JORDAN_Mychael_SCHOENFELD/research/index.hml" target="_blank">Jordan Schoenfeld</a> is Assistant Professor of Accounting at the University of Utah. This post is based on an article authored by Professor Schoenfeld and <a href="http://www.bm.ust.hk/acct/staff/actb.html" target="_blank">Thomas Bourveau</a>, Assistant Professor of Accounting at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. Related research from the Program on Corporate Governance includes <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2291577" target="_blank">The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism</a> by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang (discussed on the Forum <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/08/19/the-long-term-effects-of-hedge-fund-activism/">here</a>), <a href="http://ssrn.com/abstract=2248111" target="_blank">The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value</a> by Lucian Bebchuk (discussed on the Forum <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/04/22/the-myth-that-insulating-boards-serves-long-term-value/">here</a>), <a href="http://ssrn.com/abstract=1884226" target="_blank">The Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure</a> by Lucian Bebchuk and Robert J. Jackson Jr. (discussed on the Forum <a href="http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/06/27/should-the-sec-tighten-its-13d-rules/">here</a>), and <a href="http://ssrn.com/abstract=2258083" target="_blank">Pre-Disclosure Accumulations by Activist Investors: Evidence and Policy</a> by Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Robert J. Jackson Jr., and Wei Jiang.
</div></hgroup><p>Information is the foundation on which traders form their beliefs about a company and ultimately their investment decisions. In empirical settings, information often arrives in the form of a company disclosure. Since managers have significant discretion over disclosure, researchers have extensively studied the relation between disclosure and trading via the price system. In our paper, <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2668304" target="_blank">Shareholder Activism and Voluntary Disclosure</a>, which was recently made available on SSRN, we study the relation between disclosure and a specific class of traders, shareholder activists. The activism literature has only indirectly explored the link between company disclosures and activism. For example, several papers include financial statement variables as regressors in their empirical models of activist targeting (e.g., Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas, 2008). We extend this literature by looking at disclosure explicitly.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/10/21/shareholder-activism-and-voluntary-disclosure/#more-71855" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Shareholder Activism and Voluntary Disclosure">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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