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	<title>The Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance</title>
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		<title>Executives in Politics</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/12/12/executives-in-politics/</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/12/12/executives-in-politics/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 12 Dec 2017 14:00:44 +0000</pubDate>
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				<category><![CDATA[Academic Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Comparative Corporate Governance & Regulation]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Congressional elections]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=103453?d=20171212090044EST</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Over the last two decades, the share of corporate executives holding political office in the United States increased substantially, which resulted in large benefits for their firms and shifted the balance of power toward corporate interests On November 8, 2016 Donald Trump won the U.S. Presidency. While his election was unusual in many respects, Trump [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Ilona Babenko (Arizona State University), Viktar Fedaseyeu (Bocconi University), and Song Zhang (Boston College), on Tuesday, December 12, 2017 </em><div style="background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px"><strong>Editor's Note: </strong> <a class="external" href="http://www.public.asu.edu/~ibabenko/" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Ilona Babenko</a> is Associate Professor at Arizona State University W.P. Carey School of Business; <a class="external" href="http://faculty.unibocconi.eu/viktarfedaseyeu/" target="_blank" rel="nofollow noopener">Viktar Fedaseyeu</a> is Assistant Professor in the Department of Finance at Bocconi University; and Song Zhang is a PhD student in Finance at Boston College. This post is based on their recent <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3075177">paper</a>.
</div></hgroup><p>Over the last two decades, the share of corporate executives holding political office in the United States increased substantially, which resulted in large benefits for their firms and shifted the balance of power toward corporate interests</p>
<p>On November 8, 2016 Donald Trump won the U.S. Presidency. While his election was unusual in many respects, Trump is just one of several recent examples of corporate executives running for political office. William Harrison Binnie, a former CEO of Carlisle Plastics, Inc., unsuccessfully ran for the U.S. Senate in 2010. In 2000, Jon Corzine, a former CEO of Goldman Sachs, was elected U.S. Senator, and in 2005 became the governor of New Jersey. These examples are far from isolated. In fact, the share of federal office holders (i.e., U.S. Congressmen, Senators, and Presidents/Vice-Presidents) who had executive experience prior to being elected remained relatively flat at around 13-14% between 1980 and 2000 but then increased rather sharply to more than 21% by 2014. Why do so many executives make the switch from a career in business and run for political office? Further, how does the increase in executives’ political participation affect their firms and the legislative agenda in the United States more generally? In a new <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3075177">working paper</a>, we investigate these questions by studying the incidence of corporate executives running in U.S. federal elections between 1980 and 2014.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/12/12/executives-in-politics/#more-103453" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Executives in Politics">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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		<title>Do CEOs Affect Employee Political Choices?</title>
		<link>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/08/28/do-ceos-affect-employee-political-choices/</link>
		<comments>https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/08/28/do-ceos-affect-employee-political-choices/#respond</comments>
		<pubDate>Sun, 28 Aug 2016 13:44:54 +0000</pubDate>
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		<category><![CDATA[Campaign finance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Congressional elections]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Employees]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/?p=73579?d=20160828094454EDT</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Do CEOs affect political choices of their employees? Using a large sample of U.S. firms, we find evidence that they do. First, we document that employees donate significantly more money to CEO-supported political candidates than to otherwise similar candidates not supported by the CEO. In 2012, for example, Barack Obama raised three times more money [&#8230;]]]></description>
				<content:encoded><![CDATA[<hgroup><em>Posted by Ilona Babenko,  Arizona State University, on Sunday, August 28, 2016 </em><div style="background:#F8F8F8;padding:10px;margin-top:5px;margin-bottom:10px"><strong>Editor's Note: </strong> <a href="http://www.public.asu.edu/~ibabenko/" target="_blank">Ilona Babenko</a> is Associate Professor at W.P. Carey School of Business at Arizona State University. This post is based on a recent <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2814976" target="_blank">paper</a> by Professor Babenko, <a href="http://faculty.unibocconi.eu/viktarfedaseyeu/" target="_blank">Viktar Fedaseyeu</a>, Assistant Professor in the Department of Finance at Bocconi University, and Song Zhang, University of Lugano and Swiss Finance Institute.
</div></hgroup><p>Do CEOs affect political choices of their employees? Using a large sample of U.S. firms, we find evidence that they do. First, we document that employees donate significantly more money to CEO-supported political candidates than to otherwise similar candidates not supported by the CEO. In 2012, for example, Barack Obama raised three times more money from employees of firms whose CEOs donated to him than from employees of firms whose CEOs donated to Mitt Romney (see Figure). We find similar effects for all federal elections (House, Senate, and President). Second, we find that employees located in congressional districts where CEOs support political candidates are more likely to vote in elections, suggesting that CEOs can affect not only their employees’ campaign contributions but also voter turnout.</p>
<p> <a href="https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/08/28/do-ceos-affect-employee-political-choices/#more-73579" class="more-link"><span aria-label="Continue reading Do CEOs Affect Employee Political Choices?">(more&hellip;)</span></a></p>
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